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defeasible argumentation, non-monotonic fuzzy
reasoning and expert systems
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Abstract
Several non-monotonic formalisms exist in the field of Artificial Intelligence for
reasoning under uncertainty. Many of these are deductive and knowledge-driven,
and also employ procedural and semi-declarative techniques for inferential pur-
poses. Nonetheless, limited work exist for the comparison across distinct tech-
niques and in particular the examination of their inferential capacity. Thus, this
paper focuses on a comparison of three knowledge-driven approaches employed
for non-monotonic reasoning, namely expert systems, fuzzy reasoning and de-
feasible argumentation. A knowledge-representation and reasoning problem has
been selected: modelling and assessing mental workload. This is an ill-defined
construct, and its formalisation can be seen as a reasoning activity under un-
certainty. An experimental work was performed by exploiting three deductive
knowledge bases produced with the aid of experts in the field. These were
coded into models by employing the selected techniques and were subsequently
elicited with data gathered from humans. The inferences produced by these
models were in turn analysed according to common metrics of evaluation in the
field of mental workload, in specific validity and sensitivity. Findings suggest
that the variance of the inferences of expert systems and fuzzy reasoning mod-
els was higher, highlighting poor stability. Contrarily, that of argument-based
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models was lower, showing a superior stability of its inferences across knowl-
edge bases and under different system configurations. The originality of this
research lies in the quantification of the impact of defeasible argumentation. It
contributes to the field of logic and non-monotonic reasoning by situating de-
feasible argumentation among similar approaches of non-monotonic reasoning
under uncertainty through a novel empirical comparison.
Keywords: Defeasible Argumentation, Argumentation Theory, Explainable
Artificial Intelligence, Non-monotonic Reasoning, Fuzzy Logic, Expert
Systems, Mental Workload
1. Introduction
Uncertainty associated to incomplete, imprecise or unreliable knowledge is
inevitable in daily reasoning and in many real-world contexts. Within Artificial
Intelligence (AI), many approaches have been proposed for the development of
inferential models capable of addressing such uncertainty. Among them, non-5
monotonic reasoning emerged from the area of logical AI as an alternative to
deductive inferences in logical systems. These were perceived as inadequate
for decision making in realistic situations (Bochman, 2007). Hence, reasoning is
non-monotonic, or defeasible, when a conclusion can be withdrawn in the light of
new information (Reiter, 1988; McCarthy, 1980; Kowalski & Sadri, 1991; Longo,10
2015; Brewka, 1991). A number of approaches for dealing with quantitative
reasoning under uncertainty exist (Parsons & Hunter, 1998), including compu-
tational argumentation (also referred to as defeasible argumentation) (Prakken
& Vreeswijk, 2001), fuzzy reasoning (Zadeh et al., 1965) and expert systems
(Durkin & Durkin, 1998). These approaches have led to the development of15
non-monotonic reasoning models based upon knowledge bases often provided
by human experts. Intuitively, since these models have been developed with a
human-in-the loop intervention, their reasoning processes and their inferences
have an intrinsic higher degree of interpretability and transparency when com-
pared to data-driven approaches for inference. Moreover, they assist on the20
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creation of models that can be verified, replicated and expanded, thus enhanc-
ing the trustworthiness of domain experts towards automated inferences and
the understanding of the application under investigation. Nonetheless, these
approaches have unique features that differentiate them. For instance, previ-
ous studies (Rizzo et al., 2018b,a) suggest that defeasible argumentation offers25
more powerful conflict resolution strategies; fuzzy reasoning is suitable for robust
representation of linguistic information through the application of fuzzy mem-
bership functions; and expert systems focus on imitating the problem-solving
ability of an expert. These approaches have all been extensively used in practi-
cal domains such as medicine, pharmaceutical industry and engineering (Longo,30
2016; Glasspool et al., 2006; Mardani et al., 2015; Liao, 2005). However, scholars
have predominantly focused on their individual application for non-monotonic
reasoning, but barely attempted to empirically investigate their differences in
terms of inferential capacity.
The aim of this study is to empirically evaluate the inferential capacity of35
defeasible argumentation models when compared to other models produced by
other well established reasoning approaches, in this case non-monotonic fuzzy
reasoning and expert systems. This evaluation can clarify the predictive accu-
racy of the investigated reasoning models, allowing defeasible argumentation to
be better situated among similar reasoning approaches and enabling different40
applications and experiments to be carried out. To achieve this goal, the prob-
lem of representing the construct of Mental Workload (MWL) has been chosen.
MWL is an ill-defined construct with no clear and widely accepted definition.
In a nutshell, it can be seen as the amount of mental activity devoted to a
certain task over time (Cain, 2007). A number of knowledge bases – developed45
by experts in MWL – were employed as the basis of the modelling and assess-
ment done by the selected approaches. Resulted models are used to infer mental
workload scalars employed for achieving the envisioned comparison. In particu-
lar, the inferential capacity is compared and quantified in terms of the validity
and sensitivity (O’Donnell & Eggemeier, 1986) of the produced inferences. Fig.50
1 depicts a streamlined design of the study. With the above elements, a pre-
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cise research question can be set: “To what extent does the inferential capacity
of defeasible argumentation differ from non-monotonic fuzzy reasoning and ex-























Figure 1: Streamlined design of the study using three non-monotonic reasoning approaches
for mental workload modelling, compared according to their inferential capacity.
The remainder of this paper continues with Section 2 providing the related
work on non-monotonic reasoning, knowledge-based techniques for dealing with
non-monotonic problems and a precise description of the construct of MWL.
Section 3 presents the design of the empirical experiment aimed at answering the
above research question and the tasks performed by participants of the study in60
order to collect information for inference of MWL. The results, the analysis and
the discussion of this experiment are provided in Section 4. Eventually, Section
5 concludes the study and provides recommendations for future research.
2. Literature and related work
Inconsistent and conflicting pieces of information are often involved in real-65
world argumentative activities. To solve these, classical propositional logic has
demonstrated to be inadequate due to its monotonicity property (Reiter, 1980).
In monotonic reasoning, a knowledge base of reasons supporting certain conclu-
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sions, usually provided by domain experts, may only grow monotonically with
new reasons, not allowing the retraction of the previous conclusions. Therefore,70
defeasible reasoning has emerged as a potential solution to this problem, since
it is aimed at formalising non-monotonic reasoning activities (Dung, 1995; Rah-
wan & Simari, 2009; Chesn˜evar et al., 2000). This section introduces some of
the main non-monotonic formalisms and a few works that have attempted to
make a comparison among them. Subsequently, knowledge-base approaches, in75
particular expert systems, non-monotonic fuzzy reasoning and defeasible argu-
mentation, are explained in depth. The theories in which these approaches are
grounded are used as the building blocks for development of non-monotonic rea-
soning models of inference employed in the context of human mental workload.
To the best of the authors’ knowledge, there is a lack of comparisons among80
knowledge-based systems adopted for quantitative reasoning under uncertainty.
Hence, the main goal is to provide the reader with the intuitions and the re-
quired knowledge for comparing defeasible argumentation with similar reasoning
approaches.
2.1. Non-monotonic reasoning85
In non-monotonic reasoning, conclusions can be retracted in the light of
new reasons. In other words, non-monotonic reasoning relies on the idea that
a claim can be defeasibly derived from premises partially specified, but in the
case of an exception arising the claim can be withdrawn (Kowalski & Sadri,
1991). Many non-monotonic reasoning formalisms exist in Artificial Intelligence90
(Brewka, 1991). For instance inheritance networks with exception (Horty et al.,
1990) or semantic networks using Demptster’s rule (Ginsberg, 1984). Other
examples include non-monotonic logics like circumscription (McCarthy, 1980),
autoepistemic (Moore, 1985) and default logic (Reiter, 1980). Brewka et al.
(1997) provide a nice overview of non-monotonic logics categorized by modal-95
preference logics, fixed point logics and abductive methods. The recent work of
Hlobil (2018) presents a guideline for selection of non-monotonic logics based on
principles they reject, such as the Deduction-Detachment Theorem and Cumu-
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lative Transitivity (Czelakowski, 1985; Gabbay & Guenthner, 1984), resulting
in 17 different types of logics. A few works have proposed the extension of100
rule-based approaches, such as expert systems and fuzzy reasoning systems, to
incorporate a non-monotonic layer (El-Azhary et al., 2002; Nute et al., 1990;
Siler & Buckley, 2005; Castro et al., 1998; Morgenstern & Singh, 1997). An
alternative approach for performing non-monotonic reasoning is given by argu-
mentation systems as proposed in early studies (Birnbaum et al., 1980; Lin &105
Shoham, 1989) and other thorough surveys (Atkinson et al., 2017; Chesn˜evar
et al., 2000). This type of systems formalize non-monotonic reasoning by the
construction of arguments that can support or be against certain conclusions.
Nonetheless, only a few works have proposed a comparison among these for-
malisms. For instance, Delladio et al. (2006) investigate the relations between110
a normal default logic and a variant of a defeasible logic programming. Du-
tilh Novaes & Veluwenkamp (2017) make an empirical test of the accuracy of
two formal non-monotonic reasoning models: preferential logic and screened be-
lief revision. Yang et al. (2004) compare first order predicate logic, fuzzy logic
and non-monotonic logic implemented through negation as failure. Despite115
highlighting interesting connections among these formalisms, the focus of the
studies is usually theoretical or limited by a narrow scope. In this study, three
knowledge-based systems are investigated: expert systems, non-monotonic fuzzy
reasoning and defeasible argumentation. Knowledge-based systems are better
suited for capturing the intuitions of a specific problem when compared to non-120
monotonic logics or other proof-theoretic formalisms. Since rules or arguments
have to be predefined, only relevant non-monotonic contexts are modelled, liv-
ing little, if any, place for confusion. The next subsections provide readers with
further specific information on these.
2.2. Expert systems125
First developed by the AI community in the 1960s, expert systems are com-
puter programs created to emulate a human in a given field (Durkin & Durkin,
1998). In a nutshell, they try to transfer a vast body of specific knowledge
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from a human to a computer. In turn, the computer can make inferences and
reach a justifiable conclusion. In respect to expert system methodologies, some130
examples include rule-based systems, knowledge-based systems and fuzzy ex-
pert systems (Liao, 2005). Respectively, rule-based systems are based on rules
typically of the form “IF (antecedent) THEN (consequent)”; knowledge-based
systems are human-centred, focusing on the users, their needs and requirements;
and fuzzy expert systems employ fuzzy logic for dealing with uncertainty and135
linguistic terms. Nonetheless, regardless of the methodology, expert systems
are usually built upon two internal components: a knowledge base and an in-
ference engine (Durkin & Durkin, 1998). The former is provided by a human
expert and generally translated into a set of logical rules. The latter is aimed at
eliciting, firing and aggregating such rules towards a conclusive inference. More-140
over, engines might employ common strategies for producing inferences, such as
backward-chaining inferencing and forward-chaining inferencing. In both cases,
reasoning is exploited in a multi-step process in order to prove some goal or
hypothesis. For instance, in a backward-chaining inference process, rules that
contain a goal in their consequent part are collected and fired if their premises145
(same as antecedent) evaluate true. In turn, such premises might be supported
by other rules, causing the system to define sub-goals and to work in a recursive
fashion. Reflecting that behaviour, a forward-chaining inference process starts
by firing rules whose premises match the information initially available. In turn,
fired rules might trigger the firing of new rules, leading to a continuation of the150
process until the goal is reached or no other rule is fired. If multiple rules are
fired, both forward-chaining and backward-chaining engines might employ some
conflict resolution strategy. Common methods include choosing the first rule lo-
cated, deciding a priority for each rule or firing all possible lines of reasoning.
Other types of expert systems can also be found in the literature, such as frame-155
based expert systems or probabilistic expert systems (Durkin & Durkin, 1998;
Spiegelhalter et al., 1993).
Concerning areas of application, expert systems have been prominently used
in fields like medicine and robotics (Nohria, 2015; Singholi & Agarwal, 2018).
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For instance, medicine presents strong motivators for the development of med-160
ical expert systems, like the lack of specialists and lack of health facilities.
Most often they also require interpretable systems. Medical professionals need
to have the possibility to understand the reasoning behind a machine and the
causes that led it to make a decision. Therefore, in medical area, diagnosis
and treatment of diseases are the main goal, with expert systems built for the165
treatment of influenza, risk of hypertension, memory loss, liver disorders and
others (Nohria, 2015). In turn, robotics presents systems developed for fault de-
tection and fault tolerance, path and trajectory planning, vision control, mobile
robot control, obstacle detection in industrial robot and so on. The integration
of expert systems and robotics is a step forward factory automation still ac-170
tive and researched by the AI community (Singholi & Agarwal, 2018). A wide
range of other applications can be found in the expert system literature. Liao
(Liao, 2005) provides a decade review, with a considerable amount of specific
applications by system methodologies, such as: teaching, agriculture, financial
analysis, knowledge management, climate forecasting, decision making, urban175
design, psychiatric treatment, sensor control, waste water treatment and oth-
ers. In addition, due to its precondition of encoding human knowledge bases,
expert systems have naturally made use of different approaches for knowledge
representation, as presented in Hvam et al. (Hvam et al., 2008). These might
include graphical notations, logic, scientific formulas and rules. On more spe-180
cific cases: Mitra and Basu (Mitra & Basu, 1997) implement an expert system
which contains distinct knowledge representation schemes for designing micro-
processor based systems, while Hatzilygeroudis and Prentzas (Hatzilygeroudis
& Prentzas, 2004) propose the integration of symbolic rules, neural networks
and cases for the enhancement of knowledge representation and reasoning in185
expert systems.
Ultimately, non-monotonic techniques have been employed in expert sys-
tems in different ways (Gabbay, 1985) and used in industry with certain diffi-
culty (Morgenstern, 1998). A few examples include non-monotonic techniques
modelled through inheritance methods (Morgenstern & Singh, 1997), defeasible190
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logic (Nute et al., 1990) and default reasoning (El-Azhary et al., 2002). Here,
the notions of “contradictions” or “exceptions” are employed. These are defined
by domain experts, and describe special cases in which a rule is no longer valid
and has to be retracted from the reasoning process.
2.3. Non-monotonic fuzzy reasoning195
Fuzzy set theory, as proposed by Zadeh (Zadeh et al., 1965), uses the no-
tion of membership function, a special function that assigns to each object or
linguistic term a grade of membership in the range [0,1] ∈ R. Fuzzy sets are
formed by fuzzy objects and include similar notions to classical set theory such
as inclusion, union and intersection. A fuzzy control system or fuzzy expert200
system is a control system based on fuzzy reasoning. It is usually formed by
a set of inputs defined as a fuzzy set, a rule set and a defuzzification module
(Passino et al., 1998). In this case, this process is characterised as a Mamdani
fuzzy inference (Mamdani, 1974) (Fig. 2) and is the approach employed in this
study. Moreover, two other types of fuzzy inference methods are commonly205
found in the literature. The first, the Takagi-Sugeno fuzzy inference (Takagi
& Sugeno, 1993), presents the same fuzzification process, however, the output
membership functions are always linear or constant, producing in either case
a single number. On the one hand, there is no defuzzification process and on
the other hand, it is necessary to define weighting mechanisms or parameters210
for the linear output functions to compute a final crisp value. The second, the
Tsukamoto fuzzy inference (Tsukamoto, 1979), also differs from the other types
only by its output membership functions. In this case, consequents of each rule
are crisp values defined by a monotonical membership function and the real
input of the associated rule. Intuitively, it is a combination of the Mamdani215
and the Takagi-Sugeno fuzzy inference methods.
Since the original development of fuzzy set theory by Zadeh (Zadeh et al.,
1965), the range of its applications has been vast. Examples of application
domains include pattern recognition, decision making, signal processing, con-
trol engineering, medicine, finance and many others. Precup and Hallendoorn220
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Figure 2: General structure of a Mamdani fuzzy inference process (Cordo´n, 2011).
(Precup & Hellendoorn, 2011) present an extensive survey paper on industrial
applications of fuzzy control. Particularly, numerous applications of Mamdani
fuzzy control systems have been reported in the fields of robotics, automotive
industry and process industry. Due to the concern on the accuracy of such
applications, learning techniques have also been incorporated into fuzzy control225
systems in order to deal with the interpretability-accuracy trade-off (Cordo´n,
2011), leading to the fields of neuro-fuzzy systems (Nauck et al., 1997) and
genetic fuzzy systems (Cordo´n et al., 2004). Learning techniques might cover
structural changes ranging from the parameters optimization to the learning of
the rule set. Other works have also suggested additional extensions of fuzzy230
inference systems in order to support non-monotonicity of rules. Unfortunately,
these extensions are not well established. For example, in (Castro et al., 1998)
conflicting rules have their conclusions aggregated by an averaging function,
while in (Gegov et al., 2014) a rule-base compression method is proposed for
the reduction of non-monotonic rules. A third approach can be seen in (Siler &235
Buckley, 2005), whereby Possibility Theory (Dubois & Prade, 1998) is included
into the fuzzy reasoning system to tackle conflicting instructions. In Possibil-
ity Theory, contrarily to traditional fuzzy systems, propositions have two truth
values: possibility and necessity. The first indicates the extent to which data
fails to refute its truth while the second indicates the extent to which data sup-240
ports its truth. This theory is adopted in this study for the development of a
non-monotonic fuzzy reasoning system (detailed in Section 3.2).
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2.4. Defeasible argumentation
Argumentation, with origins grounded in philosophy, deals with the study of
assertion and definition of arguments usually emerged from divergent opinions.245
In the field of Artificial Intelligence, argumentation, also referred to as defeasible
argumentation (Bryant & Krause, 2008), is aimed at developing computational
models of arguments. Such models have become increasingly significant within
AI (Bench-Capon & Dunne, 2007), making defeasible argumentation widely em-
ployed for modelling non-monotonic reasoning (Chesn˜evar et al., 2000). Many250
studies also described its potential for practical applications, such as dialogue
and negotiation (Bench-Capon & Dunne, 2007; Black & Hunter, 2009; Kraus
et al., 1998; Amgoud et al., 2000), knowledge representation (Longo, 2015; Don-
dio & Longo, 2014) and decision making in health-care (Glasspool et al., 2006;
Longo & Dondio, 2014; Patkar et al., 2006). Some of the appealing properties255
of argument-based models include the lack of statistics or probability for in-
ference and capability to deal with partial and inconsistent pieces of evidence.
Thus, being closer to the way humans reason under uncertainty and leading to
a higher explanatory capacity (Longo, 2016). This can be exemplified by its
attempted use for the development of argumentation-based approaches to ex-260
plainable AI (Zeng et al., 2018). Moreover, their conflict resolution strategy is
strengthened by the large body of literature on acceptability semantics (Dung,
1995; Amgoud et al., 2017; Baroni et al., 2011; Baroni & Giacomin, 2009; Don-
dio, 2018). Acceptability semantics provide solid mechanisms for the selection of
acceptable arguments within a set of conflicting arguments. This set is usually265
represented by a graph in which arguments are depicted as nodes and attacks
(conflicts) between arguments are depicted as arrows. The set of acceptable
arguments is usually referred to as an extension. Acceptability semantics can
provide a unique extension or multiple extensions for the same set of conflicting
arguments. For instance, the common Dung’s grounded semantics (Dung, 1995)270
always returns a single extension while the Dung’s preferred semantics might
return a single or multiple ones (detailed in Section 3.3.4).
Several approaches also exist for quantitative argumentation, or argumen-
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tation that deals with numerical measurable arguments, such as Bipolar Ar-
gumentation, Probabilistic Argumentation, Multi-valued Argumentation and275
Weighted Argumentation (Rahwan & Simari, 2009). Despite this number of ap-
proaches, computational argumentation systems are usually structured around
layers specialised on the the definition of internal structure of arguments, the
definition of arguments interactions, the resolution of conflicts between argu-
ments and the possible resolution strategies for reaching a justifiable conclusion280
(Prakken & Vreeswijk, 2001). Still, the boundaries of such layers might not be
accurately defined. For that reason a few layered structures have been proposed
for the development of computational models of argument. Prakken & Sartor
(2002) suggest a four-layered view applied to legal argumentation that contains:
a logical layer, which defines the arguments themselves; a dialectical layer, fo-285
cused on the definition of notions such as attack and defeat; a procedural layer,
which regulates how parties can challenge and introduce new arguments; and
a strategic or heuristic layer, which defines how a dispute should be conducted
within the bounds of the procedural layers. Differently, Atkinson et al. (2017)
consider five main layers as the basic building blocks of an argumentation model:290
structural layer, relational layer, dialogical layer, assessment layer and rhetori-
cal layer. Another example of multi-layered structure can be found in (Longo,
2016) and is depicted in Fig. 3.
1) structure of arguments
2) conflicts of arguments















Figure 3: Five layers structure (Longo, 2016) adopted for the development of argument-based
models.
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This research study adopts this structured due to the nature of the ap-
plication selected for evaluation – modelling and assessment of human mental295
workload. In this case, each knowledge base employed is the result of the rea-
soning of a single agent and do not require a rhetorial layer. The objective is
to reason with arguments neutrally built from domain experts so as to achieve
a numerical inference representing the imposed mental workload by a specific
task. Each layer in this structure is supported by theoretical works in the field300
of defeasible argumentation. For example, in Layer 1, Toulmin (Toulmin, 1958)
provides one the first conceptual models of arguments aimed at contributing
with a more articulated structure for arguments. Another example is given by
Walton (Walton, 2013), who identifies and evaluates a variety of argumentation
structures in everyday discourse, such as argument from consequence, appeal305
to expert opinion, argument from analogy and argument by example. Other
models of argument are also described in (Bentahar et al., 2010). In Layer 2
the focus is on the relationship between arguments and management of their
conflicts. Prakken (Prakken, 2010) proposes a conflict classification with three
different classes: undermining attack when an argument is attacked on one of its310
premises, rebutting attack when an argument negates the conclusion of another
argument and undercutting attack, when an argument is attacked at one of its
defeasible inference rules. Following to Layer 3, the focus is now on the ability
to characterize the success of an attack. Commonly, attacks have a form of a
binary relation. In a binary attack relation all attacks are successful if they have315
a target (argument being attacked) and source (argument attacking) defined.
However, other approaches are presented in the literature, such as: strength of
arguments, preferentiality and strength of attack relations (Dunne et al., 2011;
Modgil, 2009; Martınez et al., 2008). The first one presents the inequality of the
strength of arguments that has to be accounted for in a decision-making pro-320
cess. Preferentiality assumes the information necessary to decide whether an
attack between two arguments is successful is pre-specified. The last approach,
strength of attack relations, tries to associate weights to attack relations in-
stead of arguments. Given an evaluation of attacks, acceptability semantics,
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placed in Layer 4, can be employed for the definition of the acceptability sta-325
tus of arguments. Dung semantics (Dung, 1995) and its variations (Caminada,
2007; Caminada et al., 2012) are the most well known. Other types include
SCC-recursive semantics (Baroni et al., 2005) focused on solving cyclic attack
relations of odd-length and ranking-based semantics (Bonzon et al., 2016) which
rank arguments from most acceptable to weakest one(s). Finally, the selection330
of extensions and the accrual of acceptable arguments is done in Layer 5. A few
strategies (Coste-Marquis et al., 2012; Konieczny et al., 2015) can be found in
the literature for selection of extensions, such as the employment of the strength
of arguments from Layer 3 or the selection of the extension(s) with higher car-
dinality. Nonetheless, this layer is not always required and is seemingly the less335
developed in the literature, requiring further investigation.
Some works tackle all these 5 layers (Chang et al., 2009; Hunter & Williams,
2010; Craven et al., 2012) while others do not (Patkar et al., 2006; Glasspool
et al., 2006; Grando et al., 2013). This structure has also been reproduced in past
studies (Rizzo & Longo, 2017; Rizzo et al., 2018a; Longo, 2015; Rizzo & Longo,340
2018) demonstrating structural effectiveness in different domains of application.
Unfortunately, despite the increasing application of argumentation in various
theoretical fields, the use of defeasible argumentation in practical fields is one of
the challenges in respect to the general deployment of argumentation technology
as suggested by Bench-Capon et al. (Bench-Capon & Dunne, 2007). This345
challenge represents the main motivation behind the research question outlined
in the introductory section.
2.5. Mental workload
To tackle the research question, a precise knowledge representation and rea-
soning problem has been selected: mental workload (MWL) modelling. Note350
that this problem is not the focus of this research study, but only an applica-
tion that allows the proposed comparison among the non-monotonic reasoning
approaches to be performed. Thus, only a brief introduction of its concept,
methods of measurement and evaluation metrics are provided here. The inter-
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ested reader can refer to the citations along this section for further information.355
Although no single definition has been developed so far (Young et al., 2015;
Hart, 2006), MWL can be intuitively described as the total cognitive cost needed
to accomplish a specific task over time (Cain, 2007). According to Cain (2007),
the main reason for measuring MWL is to quantify the mental cost of performing
a certain task in order to predict operator and system performance. It is mainly360
used in the areas of psychology and ergonomics, with applications in aviation
and auto-mobile industries (Paxion et al., 2014) and in interface and web design
(Tracy & Albers, 2006).
Since no correct measure of MWL exists, there are different methods that
have been proposed for measuring it (Eggemeier, 1988). These can be cate-365
gorised into subjective measures, task performance measures and physiological
measures. Task performance measures try to infer MWL from objective notions
of performance, like number of errors, completion time and time to respond
to a secondary task. Physiological measures try to infer a MWL scalar from
physiological responses, like pupillary reflex or muscle activity. In this work we370
adopt the class of subjective measures. This class leans on the analysis of the
subjective feedback (such as questionnaires) provided by humans engaging with
an underlying task. Among well known methods, the NASA-Task Load Index
(NASA-TLX) (Hart & Staveland, 1988) has been largely employed in the last
decades (Rizzo et al., 2016; Longo, 2014, 2015) and it is adopted in this research375
study for comparison purposes. It is a combination of six factors believed to in-
fluence mental workload: temporal demand, physical demand, mental demand,
frustration, effort and performance (Hart & Staveland, 1988). Each factor d is
quantified with a subjective judgement coupled with a weight w computed via
a pairwise comparison procedure. The set of questionnaires employed for mea-380
surement of each factor can be seen in Table A.11 (page 75). The final MWL
scalar is the weighted average of these six factors di and weights wi provided by
the operator (equation 1). The pairwise comparison procedure is made through
a set of questions, for example “which contributed more for the MWL: mental
demand or effort?”, “performance or frustration?”, giving a total of 15 prefer-385
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ences. The number of times each feature is chosen defines its weight. A few
modified versions of the NASA-TLX have also been proposed. Among them, the
most common is referred to as Raw TLX (RTLX) (Hart, 2006). It removes the
pairwise comparison procedure of NASA-TLX and instead averages the features
(equation 2). According to (Hart, 2006), comparisons between the NASA-TLX390
and the RTLX seem inconclusive, being both more or less sensitive than the












Another MWL assessment technique is the Workload Profile (WP) which is
based on the Multiple Resource Theory (MRT) (Wickens, 1991). Contrarily to
the NASA-TLX, it is built upon 8 dimensions: solving and deciding, selection of
response, task and space, verbal material, visual resources, auditory resources,
manual response and speech response (Table A.17, questions 6-13). The user is
required to rate each feature in the range 0 to 1. The final scalar is given then





Several criteria have been proposed for the selection and development of
inferential models of MWL (O’Donnell & Eggemeier, 1986), such as: diagnos-395
ticity, reliability, sensitivity and validity among others. Since the goal of this
research study is to evaluate the ability of non-monotonic reasoning techniques
to represent and assess MWL, the focus is on three different forms of validity
and sensitivity:
• convergent validity: it demonstrates the extent to which different MWL400
techniques correlate to each other(Tsang & Velazquez, 1996).
• concurrent validity: it determines to what extent a technique can explain
measures of objective performance, such as task execution time (Rubio
et al., 2004).
• face validity: it determines the extent to which a technique is relevant to405
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the persons answering the questions. Or if the workload reported seems
to be valid to participants of the experiment (Spielberger et al., 2010).
• sensitivity: it determines the capability of a technique to discriminate
significant variations in MWL and changes in resource demand or task
difficulty (O’Donnell & Eggemeier, 1986).410
Validity and its particular sub-forms have normally been assessed through
the analysis of correlation coefficients (Rubio et al., 2004) between produced
MWL scalars, while sensitivity has been formally evaluated by analysis of vari-
ance coupled with post hoc analysis (Rubio et al., 2004; Longo, 2015).
In summary, MWL is a complex construct built over a network of pieces415
of evidence; accounting and understanding the relationships of these pieces of
evidence as well as resolving the inconsistencies arising from their interaction
is essential in modelling MWL (Longo, 2014). In formal logics, these activities
are the key components of a defeasible argumentative process, where a set of
interactive pieces of evidence, called arguments, can be defeated by additional420
arguments (Longo, 2014). To the best of our knowledge, Longo (2012) was the
first to attempt to model MWL as a non-monotonic concept. Thus, in spite of
MWL not being the focus of this research, it is important to highlight that no
other authors have followed this modelling approach. Previous works have in-
vestigated the use of expert systems for MWL modelling (Rizzo et al., 2016) and425
the comparison of defeasible argumentation and non-monotonic fuzzy reasoning
(Rizzo & Longo, 2019, 2017). Nonetheless, these are not comprehensive stud-
ies, employing small sets of data and limited sets of inference models. Here, a
thorough investigation has been proposed, extending preceding studies and fine
tuning designed inference models. In particular, this research is secondary in430
terms of data employed. It employs information of studies proposed in (Longo,
2018b; Longo & Orru, 2019; Longo, 2018a, 2017; Longo & Dondio, 2015) for
the evaluation of MWL imposed on participants who performed two types of
tasks: information seeking web-based tasks and attendance to third-level classes
delivered at the Technological University Dublin (a detailed description of these435
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tasks if given in Section 3.4). The answers provided by these participants led to
the creation of three different datasets evaluated simultaneously in this study. In
specific, they were used to elicit the non-monotonic reasoning models introduced
in the next section.
3. Design and methodology440
In order to answer the research question a primary quantitative research
was designed as depicted in Fig. 4. Empirical evidence was employed with two
objectives in mind:
Dataset 1 Dataset 2 Dataset 3










1. Structure of arguments
2. Conflicts of arguments
3. Evaluation of conflicts
4. Dialectical status













Figure 4: Evaluation strategy schema and full inferential process applied to three distinct
knowledge-bases instantiated by three distinct datasets.
1. To investigate the capacity of non-monotonic reasoning models to assess
the construct of MWL according to state-of-the-art MWL measurement445
18
techniques (NASA-TLX, Raw TLX and WP).
2. To investigate the quality of inferences produced by non-monotonic rea-
soning models.
The hypothesis for objective 1 is that non-monotonic reasoning models will
demonstrate high convergent validity with baseline instruments, thus being able450
to assess MWL. The hypothesis for objective 2 is that defeasible argumentation
models will demonstrate higher sensitivity, higher concurrent validity and higher
face validity than fuzzy reasoning and expert system models, thus showing that
defeasible argumentation has a better inferential capacity than the other non-
monotonic reasoning approaches. Table 1 lists the hypotheses and methods455
associated to each objective of this research study.
Table 1: Objectives and hypotheses of the research study.
Objective 1 Evaluation of the capacity to assess the construct of MWL.
Method Evaluation of convergent validity.
Hypothesis 1
Non-monotonic reasoning models will demonstrate moderate to
high convergent validity with baseline instruments.
Objective 2 Investigate the quality of produced inferences.
Method Evaluation of face validity, concurrent validity and sensitivity.
Hypothesis 2
Defeasible argumentation models will demonstrate higher sensi-
tivity, higher concurrent validity and higher face validity than
fuzzy reasoning and expert system models.
Three knowledge bases (Appendix A), designed by two interviewed experts,
were employed for the construction of models capable of inferring a mental
workload scalar (value in the range [0, 100] ∈ R). Each knowledge base was
built with rules constructed by only considering the information gathered with460
well known self-reporting mental workload instruments. Each rule was subse-
quently elicited with the data associated to its premises. The construction of
datasets, knowledge bases and description of performed tasks designed to as-
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sess MWL are detailed in the following subsections. As summarised in Fig.
4, non-monotonic reasoning models are firstly built upon an expert knowledge465
base and a reasoning approach. Secondly, these models are instantiated with
the data associated to the selected knowledge base and the respective inferences
are produced (MWL scalars). This process is repeated for each knowledge base.
Finally, the inferences produced using all knowledge bases are compared against
each other to test the research hypotheses.470
3.1. Expert systems
Focused on imitating the problem-solving ability of a human expert, expert
systems are one of the most well known reasoning approaches in the literature.
A step-by-step description of their inferential process is provided along with a
running example (Fig. 5) for the problem chosen in this paper: mental workload475
modelling and assessment. This example is referred throughout this section and
is aimed at providing a complete overview of the expert system procedure for
inferring a MWL scalar with real-world data.
3.1.1. IF-THEN rules and contradictions
The first step of an expert system is to model a knowledge base usually480
gathered from an expert with rules of the form “IF (antecedent) THEN (con-
sequent)”. In this research study, the antecedent is one or a set of premises
associated to a number of MWL features, believed by the expert, to influence
MWL, while the consequent is associated to a possible MWL level that can
be deductively derived from the premises. Examples of hypothetical rules are485
described below:
- Rule 1: IF low mental demand THEN underload MWL
- Rule 2: IF low effort THEN fitting load MWL
Each level of a premise in the antecedent, as well as each level of the con-
sequent, are mapped to a numerical range by the domain expert. The input490


















FR1 : IF low frustration THEN underload
MD4 : IF high mental demand THEN overload
PF3 : IF medium upper performance
THEN fitting minus load
TD2 : IF medium lower temporal demand
THEN fitting minus load
EF3 : IF medium upper effort
THEN fitting plus load
Contradictions
R3a: IF FR1 THEN not MD4
R3b: IF MD4 THEN not FR1
(B) IF-THEN rules and contradictions
from activated rules
PF3 : IF medium upper performance
THEN fitting minus load
TD2 : IF medium lower temporal demand
THEN fitting minus load
EF3 : IF medium upper effort
THEN fitting plus load
(C) Non discarded rules
Rule Value Conclusion
PF3 49 fitting minus load
TD2 45 fitting minus load






Figure 5: An illustration of a reasoning process of an expert system. The order of operations
is from step (A) to step (E).
be contradicted by other rules which intend to bring forward and support con-
tradictory information. An example of a hypothetical contradiction is:
- Contradiction 1: IF high effort THEN not Rule 1
The set of IF-THEN rules and the set of contradictions is now ready to be495
elicited. In detail, the second step of the expert system is to define the inference
engine aimed at firing rules and solving contradictions among them.
3.1.2. Inference engine
The inference engine starts with the activation of IF-THEN rules and con-
tradictions with real-world data. This means that input data will be used to500
evaluate antecedents of rules and contradictions, firing a sub-set whose eval-
uation returns true. If both a IF-THEN rule and at least one contradiction
challenging the rule have been activated, then the inference engine discards the
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rule. This mechanism will eventually form a set of surviving rules. Fig. 5.A,
5.B and 5.C respectively depict the input values in the running example, the505
set of activated rules and the set of surviving rules. Note that these rules and
arguments come from a real knowledge base that can be seen in Appendix A.
They may not be the same as hypothetical rules and contradictions, such as
Rule 2 and Contraction 1. Experts can have different opinions and the fact that
a set of premises infers a conclusion in one knowledge base does not mean it has510
to infer the same conclusion in another knowledge base.
3.1.3. Rules quantification and aggregation
The rules in the set of surviving rules might have distinct consequents. For
example, in this research study, there might be rules inferring different MWL lev-
els. Since the goal is to aggregate them and extract an unique scalar, most rep-515
resentative of the imposed mental workload, an aggregation strategy is needed.
In this situation, a usual expert system would have a typical set of choices for se-
lection of rules, for example: deciding a priority for each rule, returning multiple
outcomes or choosing the first rule activated. However, none of these strategies
is applicable in this research study. The knowledge bases do not explicit prefer-520
ences among rules, order of activation or possibility to compute more than one
output. Because of that, rules have to be quantified and aggregated1 to infer a
MWL scalar in the range [0, 100] ∈ R.
In the quantification step, a value has to be attributed for each surviving IF-
THEN rule. In this study, this value is defined according to the numerical range525
of the consequent of the rule, the numerical range of its premises and the input
values provided for the rule activation. In the basic scenario of an IF-THEN rule
with only one premise, it will be quantified as the minimum (resp. maximum)
value of the numerical range of its consequent if its premise is activated with its
1A third step, after the definition of rules and inference engine, is provided here for the
design of expert system models. Commonly, the final inference of usual expert systems is given
by the inference engine. However, in the interest of clarity, quantification and aggregation of
rules are defined in a third step, which could theoretically still be part of the inference engine.
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minimum (resp. maximum) value. For instance, consider Rule 2 rewritten with530
hypothetical numerical ranges:
- Rule 2 rewritten: IF effort ∈ [0, 33] THEN MWL ∈ [33, 66]
In this case, if the input value for effort is 0, then Rule 2 value will be
33. Analogously, if the input value for effort is 33, Rule 2 value will be
66. Activation values in between 0 and 33 are evaluated according to a linear535
relationship. To formalize the generic case, IF-THEN rules are precisely defined,
followed by the definition of the function f that returns their value:
Definition 1 (Generic IF-THEN rule). A generic IF-THEN rule is defined,
without loss of generalisability, as:
IF (i1 ∈ [l1, u1] AND i2 ∈ [l2, u2] ) OR (i3 ∈ [l3, u3] AND i4 ∈ [l4, u4])540
THEN MWL ∈ [lc, uc]
Where in ∈ R is the input value of the feature n with numerical range [ln ∈ R,
un ∈ R]; [lc ∈ R, uc ∈ R] is the numerical range for the MWL level being
inferred; and AND and OR are boolean logical operators.
Definition 2 (Generic rule value). The value of a generic IF-THEN rule r545
is given by the function:
f(r) = (uc−lc)Rmax−Rmin × (v −Rmax) + uc, where
v = min[max(i1, i2),max(i3, i4)],
Rmax = min[max(u1, u2),max(u3, u4)],
Rmin = min[max(l1, l2),max(l3, l4)]550
Note that the value of a rule will always lies between the numerical range
[lc, uc] of the MWL level being inferred. In a nutshell, Def. 2 provides a nor-
malization formula for rules that employ logical operators AND/OR, replacing
them for max and min operators2. Fig. 5.D provides a numerical example.
2Different operators could have been employed if defined by the knowledge base designer.
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Finally, four heuristics are defined to accomplish the aggregation of surviving555
IF-THEN rules inferring some MWL level. The strategies are developed in order
to extract different points of view from the remaining rules and accommodate
the use of rule weights. No preference or weight among rules is provided in
the employed knowledge bases, still the pairwise comparison procedure of the
NASA-TLX is adapted here as a form of rule weight. The aim is to investigate560
the impact of adding this extra information on the inferential capacity of the
expert system models. In the pairwise comparison procedure, the number of
times a feature has been chosen over another is its respective weight, which
in turn will also represent the weight of the IF-THEN rules whose antecedents
contain such feature. Observe that instead of general rule weights, rules will565
have different weights on a case by case basis.
- h1: definition of the sets of surviving rules grouped by their MWL level.
Extraction of the largest set. Average of the values of the rules in the
largest set. In case two or more largest sets exist, the above process is
repeated for each of them and their average is returned. The idea is to570
give importance to the largest set of surviving rules supporting the same
MWL level.
- h2: same as h1 but applying the weighted average instead of the average.
The goal here is to add the information from the pairwise comparison
procedure provided by the NASA-TLX questionnaire.575
- h3: average value of all surviving IF-THEN rules. This is to give equal
importance to all surviving IF-THEN rules, regardless of which level of
MWL they were supporting.
- h4: same as h3 but applying the weighted average instead of the average.
Again, the goal is to employ the information of the pairwise comparison580
procedure of the NASA-TLX.
Fig. 5.E depicts the output for two heuristics.
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3.2. Non-monotonic fuzzy reasoning
For comparison purposes, fuzzy reasoning is the second reasoning approach
selected in this research study. It provides a robust representation of linguistic585
information by using fuzzy membership functions. In addition, it considers
Possibility Theory (Dubois & Prade, 1998) in the reasoning process to tackle
non-monotonicity. Similarly to expert systems, a running example of a single
inference with real-world data is depicted in Fig. 6 and referred throughout this
subsection.590
3.2.1. Fuzzification module
The first step, the fuzzification module, starts with the definition of fuzzy
IF-THEN rules and fuzzy contradictions. Hypothetical examples of these are:
- Fuzzy Rule 1: IF low mental demand THEN underload MWL
- Fuzzy Rule 2: IF low effort THEN fitting load MWL595
- Fuzzy Contradiction 1: IF high effort THEN not Fuzzy Rule 1.
Fig. 6.A and Fig. 6.B depict the representation of the knowledge base of an
expert with fuzzy IF-THEN rules and fuzzy contradictions.
Afterwards, each linguistic term associated to a feature level or MWL level,
such as low or underload, is described by a fuzzy membership function (FMF)600
that is also provided by the knowledge base designers. Appendix A.4 depicts
the three options provided, using linear, trapezoidal and Gaussian shapes. In
the running example, membership functions for MWL levels and feature levels
and can be seen in Fig. 6.C and Fig. 6.D respectively.
3.2.2. Inference engine605
Once the fuzzification step has been completed and the knowledge base of
the expert translated into fuzzy rules and fuzzy contradictions, the next step
is to solve such contractions. Possibility Theory is used here as a possible




















FR1 : IF low frustration THEN underload
MD4 : IF high mental demand THEN overload
PF3 : IF medium upper performance
THEN fitting minus load
TD2 : IF medium lower temporal demand
THEN fitting minus load
EF3 : IF medium upper effort
THEN fitting plus load
Fuzzy contradictions
R3a: IF FR1 THEN not MD4
R3b: IF MD4 THEN not FR1
(B) Fuzzy IF-THEN rules and fuzzy
contradictions from activated rules
(C) Example of membership func-
tions for MWL levels
(D) Example of membership func-
tions for feature levels
Rules Zadeh  Lukas. Prod.
FR1 0.28 0.28 0.28
MD4 0.21 0.21 0.21
PF3 1 1 1
TD2 0.75 0.75 0.75
EF3 1 1 1




FR1 final: min(0.28, 1 - 0.21) = 0.28
MD4 final: min(0.21, 1 - 0.28) = 0.21








PF3 1 fitting minus load
TD2 0.75 fitting minus load
EF3 1 fitting plus load
(G) Final truth values of IF-THEN
rules after solving contradictions
MWL Zadeh  Lukas. Product
Underload 0.28 0.28 0.28
Fitting minus 1 1 1
Fitting plus 1 1 1
Overload 0.21 0.21 0.21
(H) Final aggregated MWL levels
truth values for different fuzzy logics
(I) Graphical representation of the ag-
gregated FMFs of MWL levels
Defuzzif. Zadeh  Lukas. Product
Centroid (47.6, 0.23) (47.6, 0.23) (47.6, 0.23)
Mean of max 50 50 50
(J) Defuzzification of (I) and final inference
Figure 6: An illustration of a reasoning process of a fuzzy reasoning system with the property
of non-monotonicity. The order of operations is from step (A) to step (J).
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rule based systems. According to this approach, truth values can be represented
by possibility (Pos) and necessity (Nec) as defined in Section 2.3. Both are
values between [0, 1] ∈ R. Possibility of a proposition can also be seen as the
upper bound of its respective necessity (Pos ≥ Nec). In this study, necessity
represents the membership grade of a proposition and possibility is always 1
for all propositions. Under these circumstances, the effect on the necessity of a
proposition A by a set of propositions Q which contradicts A is derivable as:
Nec(A) = min(Nec(A),¬Nec(Q1), . . . ,¬Nec(Qn)) (4)
where ¬Nec(Q) = 1−Nec(Q). Sidnce there is no addition of supporting infor-
mation but only attempts to contradict or refute information, equation (4) can
deal with the contradictions in the knowledge bases of this study. For instance,
the truth value of the Fuzzy Rule 1, assuming that it is contradicted only by
the Fuzzy Contradiction 1, is given by:610
- Truth value of Fuzzy Rule 1 =
min (Nec(low mental demand), 1 - Nec(high effort))
Nec(low mental demand) is the membership grade of the linguistic variable
low of the feature mental demand. For instance, if mental demand = 1, then
Nec(low mental demand) = 1, according to the membership function low of615
Fig. A.26b (p. 83). Also, for instance, if Nec(high effort) = 0 then it must
be noted that the Fuzzy Contradiction 1 has no impact on the Fuzzy Rule 1
and if Nec(high effort) = 1 the new truth value of the Fuzzy Rule 1 is 0.
Values between 1 and 0 indicates that the Fuzzy Rule 1 is partially refuted.
The truth value of the Fuzzy Rule 1 represents the truth value of underload in620
this particular rule.
It is important to highlight that the approach developed in (Siler & Buckley,
2005) has been inspired by a multi-step forward-chaining reasoning system. In
this research study, reasoning is done in a single step, in the sense that data
is imported and all rules are fired at once. However, it is possible to define a625
precedence order of fuzzy contradictions. More exactly, it is possible to define a
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tree structure in which the consequent of a fuzzy contradiction is the antecedent
of the next fuzzy contradiction. In this way, equation (4) can be applied from
the root or roots to the leaves. This approach is sufficient for knowledge bases
that do not contain cyclic exceptions, but according to the knowledge bases630
employed in this study, that is not the case. For instance consider the following
hypothetical fuzzy IF-THEN rules and their fuzzy contradictions:
- Fuzzy Rule 3: IF low temporal demand THEN underload
- Fuzzy Rule 4: IF high frustration THEN overload
- Fuzzy Contradic. 2: IF low temporal demand THEN not Fuzzy Rule 4635
- Fuzzy Contradic. 3: IF high frustration THEN not Fuzzy Rule 3
In this case it is not clear if Fuzzy Contradiction 2 or 3 should be solved
first. Given that there is no information on the knowledge bases (accounted in
this study as per Appendix A) to decide whether a fuzzy rule or a fuzzy con-
tradiction is more important than another, here they are solved simultaneously.640
Firstly, the truth values of all fuzzy rules are stored before solving any cyclic
fuzzy contradictions. Secondly, the final truth value of fuzzy rules is calculated
according to equation (4) and the temporary values stored before as per example
below:
- Temp1 = Nec(Fuzzy Rule 3) = Nec(low temporal demand)645
- Temp2 = Nec(Fuzzy Rule 4) = Nec(high frustration)
- Truth value Fuzzy Rule 3 = min (Nec(low temporal demand), 1 - Temp2))
- Truth value Fuzzy Rule 4 = min (Nec(high frustration), 1 - Temp1))
Having a mechanism to solve fuzzy contradictions, fuzzy operators can be
applied to the antecedents of fuzzy IF-THEN rules and for the aggregation of the650
consequents (MWL levels) across the rules. Three known operators are selected
for investigation: the Zadeh, the Product and the  Lukasiewicz operators. Table
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2 lists the t-norms and t-conorms (fuzzy AND and fuzzy OR) respectively for
each operator. Antecedents might employ OR or/and AND, while consequents
(MWL levels) are aggregated only by the OR operator. For instance, the truth655
value of underload in a context where only Fuzzy Rule 1 and Fuzzy Rule 3 infer
underload is “Nec(Fuzzy Rule 1) OR Nec(Fuzzy Rule 3)”.
Table 2: T-Norms and t-Conorms employed for two propositions a and b
Fuzzy operator T-Norm T-Conorm
Zadeh min(a,b) max(a,b)
 Lukasiewicz max(a + b - 1, 0) min(a + b, 1)
Product a.b a + b - a.b
Fig 6.E, 6.F and 6.G respectively depicts the truth values of fuzzy rules, the
resolution of the contradictions and the updated truth values of fuzzy rules.
At this stage if rule weights are defined these should be applied to the current660
truth values of fuzzy IF-THEN rules. In this study, the approach proposed
by (Ishibuchi & Nakashima, 2001) is selected. In this case, rule weights are
normalized in the range [0, 1] ∈ R and multiplied by the current truth value of
each rule. Weights are provided by the pairwise comparison procedure of the
NASA-TLX questionnaire (Table A.13) and adapted as in the expert systems665
design (Section 3.1.3).
Eventually, the truth values of the final MWL levels are generated by ag-
gregating the consequents of the fuzzy IF-THEN rules using the OR operator.
Fig. 6.H depicts an example with no rule weights.
3.2.3. Defuzzification module670
The output of the inference engine is a graphic representation of the aggre-
gation of the consequents (MWL levels) of the updated fuzzy IF-THEN rules
(Fig. 6.I). Several methods can be used for calculating a single defuzzified scalar
(Hellendoorn & Thomas, 1993). Two are selected here: mean of max and cen-
troid. The first returns the average of all elements (MWL levels) with maximal675
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membership grade. The second returns the coordinates (x, y) of the centre of
gravity of the geometric shape formed by the aggregation of the membership
functions associated to each consequent (MWL level). The defuzzified scalar is
represented then by the x coordinate of the centroid (as per Fig. 6.J).
3.3. Defeasible argumentation680
The definition of argument based-models follows the 5 layer modelling ap-
proach proposed in (Longo, 2016) and depicted in Fig. 3 (Section 2.4). It starts
with the definition of the internal structure of arguments, followed by the def-
inition of conflicts among arguments, the definition of the acceptance status
of each argument and the aggregation of the accepted arguments. A running685
example is depicted in Fig. 7 and referred throughout this subsection.
3.3.1. Layer 1 - Definition of the internal structure of arguments
Most commonly an argument is composed of one or more premises that
provides reason or support a conclusion. Thus, the first step of an argumentation
process usually focuses on the construction of forecast arguments defined as:690
Forecast argument : premises→ conclusion
This structure includes a set of premises (believed to influence the conclu-
sion being inferred) and a conclusion derivable by applying the inference rule
→. It is an uncertain implication which is used to represent a defeasible argu-
ment. In order to solve the application in hand (MWL), similarly to the rules695
of expert systems, premises and conclusions are strictly bounded in numerical
ranges associated to natural language terms (for instance low and underload).
An example of a hypothetical forecast argument is given below (it matches Rule
1 of Section 3.1.1):
− ARG 1: low mental demand → underload700
In the running example, the selected knowledge base and input values (Fig.
7.* and 7.A) are the same employed in the expert systems and the non-monotonic
fuzzy reasoning system (as per Fig. 5 and Fig. 6 respectively). The forecast




















FR1 : low frustration → underload
MD4 : high mental demand → overload
PF3 : medium upper performance → fitting minus load
TD2 : medium lower temporal demand → fitting minus load
EF3 : medium upper effort → fitting plus load
(B) Forecast arguments from activated
rules in the knowledge-base
Undercutting attacks
R3a: low frustration ⇒ ¬ MD4
R3b: high mental demand ⇒ ¬ FR1
(C) Undercutting attacks from activated
contradictions in the knowledge-base
(D) Sub-argumentation frame-
work









PF3 fitting minus load 49
TD2 fitting minus load 45
EF3 fitting plus load 50







(I) Accrual (average) of accepted
forecast arguments by each semantic
Figure 7: An illustration of a reasoning process of an argument-based defeasible reasoning
system. The order of operations is from step (A) to step (I). The argumentation framework
related to the knowledge base employed is depicted in step (*).
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3.3.2. Layer 2 - Definition of the conflicts of arguments705
In order to evaluate inconsistencies, the notion of mitigating argument (Matt
et al., 2010) is introduced. This is formed by a set of premises and an under-
cutting inference ⇒ to an argument B (forecast or mitigating):
Mitigating argument : premises⇒ ¬B
Both forecast and mitigating arguments are special defeasible rules, as defined in710
(Prakken, 2010). Informally, if their premises hold then presumably (defeasibly)
their conclusions also hold. Different types of mitigating arguments exist in the
literature, such as rebuttal and undermining (Prakken, 2010). In this research,
the notion of undercutting attack is employed for the construction of mitigating
arguments and thus enabling the resolution of conflicts. An undercutting attack715
defines an exception, where some inference carried out in the attacked argument
is no longer allowed. Contradictions, such as in Section 3.1.1, represent the in-
formation necessary for the construction of undercutting attacks. For example,
the corresponding hypothetical mitigating argument that can be constructed
from Contradiction 1 (Section 3.1.1) via an undercutting attack is:720
− UA1: high effort ⇒ ¬ ARG 1
All forecast arguments and undercutting attacks form an argumentation
framework (AF) (as in Fig. 7.∗). Fig. 7.C lists the activated undercutting
attacks for the input values (Fig. 7.A). In this example undercutting attacks
originate from the contradiction “C3: FR1 and MD4 cannot coexist”, listed in725
Table A.15. It was defined by a domain expert and manually translated as two
undercutting attacks.
3.3.3. Layer 3 - Evaluation of the conflicts of arguments
At this stage, the created AF can be elicited with data. Forecast and miti-
gating arguments can be activated or discarded, based on whether their premises730
evaluate true or false. Consequently, attacks between activated arguments will
be evaluated before being activated as well. As mentioned in Section 2.4, at-
tacks usually have a form of a binary relation. In a binary relation a successful
(activated) attack occurs whenever both its source (attacking argument) and
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its target (argument being attacked) are activated. Another approach that can735
be adapted in this study is the strength of arguments. In this case, similarly to
the definition of rule weights in expert system and fuzzy reasoning, the strength
of each argument is extracted from the pairwise comparison procedure of the
NASA-TLX. The number of times a feature has been chosen in the pairwise
comparison procedure will represent the feature strength, which in turn will740
also represent the strength of the arguments employing such feature. Conse-
quently, an attack is considered successful only if the strength of its source is
equal or greater to the strength of its target.
From the activated forecast/mitigating arguments and successful attacks, a
sub-argumentation framework emerges (sub-AF), as in Fig. 7.D. This is equiv-745
alent to the Abstract Argumentation proposed in Dung (1995).
3.3.4. Layer 4 - Definition of the acceptance status of arguments
Given a sub-AF acceptability semantics (Baroni et al., 2011; Dung, 1995)
are applied to compute the acceptance status of each argument, that means
its acceptability. An argument A is defeated by B if there is a valid attack750
from A to B (Dung, 1995). Not only that, but it is also necessary to evaluate
if the defeaters are defeated themselves. Hence, acceptability semantics are
aimed at evaluating which arguments are ultimately defeated. A set of non
defeated arguments is called extension, or a subset of arguments that can be
mutually acceptable according to some rationale. Extensions are in turn used755
in the 5th layer of the reasoning structure of Fig. 3 (p. 12), to produce a final
inference. The internal structure of arguments is not considered in this layer,
that is why the definition of sub-AF here is equivalent to the notion of abstract
argumentation framework (AAF) as proposed by Dung (Dung, 1995). An AAF
is a pair < Arg, attacks > where: Arg is a finite set of abstract arguments,760
attacks ⊆ Arg × Arg is binary relation over Arg. Given sets X,Y ⊆ Arg, X
attacks Y if and only if there exists x ∈ X and y ∈ Y such that (x, y) ∈ attacks.
A set X ⊆ Arg of argument is:
- admissible iff X does not attack itself and X attacks every set of arguments
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Y such that Y attacks X;765
- complete iff X is admissible and X contains all arguments it defends, where
X defends x if and only if X attacks all attackers of x;
- grounded iff X is minimally complete (with respect to ⊆);
- preferred iff X is maximally admissible (with respect to ⊆)
These represent a few argument-based semantics among others that have770
been proposed in the literature (Baroni et al., 2011). However, here the focus is
on the grounded and preferred semantics. Fig. 7.E, 7.F and 7.G depict different
extensions when employing the grounded and preferred semantics in the running
example.
3.3.5. Layer 5 - Accrual of acceptable arguments775
Eventually, in the last step of the reasoning process, a final inference has to
be produced. In case multiple extensions are computed, one extension might be
favoured over the others. In this study, the cardinality of an extension (number
of accepted arguments) is used as a mechanism for selecting the favoured one.
Intuitively, a larger extension of arguments might be seen as more relevant than780
smaller extensions. In case some of the computed extensions have the same
highest cardinality, these are all brought forward in the reasoning process. After
the selection of the larger extension/s, a single scalar is produced through the
accrual of its/their arguments. This is defined by the set of accepted forecast
arguments within an extension (those that support a MWL level). Mitigating785
arguments already completed their roles by contributing to the resolution of
conflicting information (layer 4) and thus are not considered in this layer. For
each forecast argument, a final scalar is generated for its representation. It
follows from the same formula described in Def. 2 (Section 3.1.3). Fig. 7.H lists
the values computed for the forecast arguments in the running example. The790
overall MWL level brought forward by an extension is computed by aggregating
the scalars of its forecast arguments. This aggregation can be done in different
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ways, for instance considering measures of central tendency. Here, similarly to
expert systems, the average and the weighted average are accounted for, with
arguments weights being defined the same way as their strengths are. Fig. 7.I795
concludes the running example by depicting the outcome of each semantics using
the average operator. Note that since there are two preferred extensions with
the same number of accepted forecast arguments, the outcome of the preferred
semantics is the mean of its two extensions.
3.4. Participants and procedures800
Three distinct experiments were performed with human subjects. In the first
and second, a number of third-level classes were delivered to students at the
Technological University Dublin, School of Computer Science, Dublin, Ireland.
In the third, nine information seeking web-based tasks of varying difficulty and
demand were performed by volunteer participants over three popular web-sites:805
Google, Wikipedia and Youtube. Subjects were briefed about the study and
they were requested to sign a consent form that included data protection and
treatment. Privacy and anonymity of participants were in all respects protected
by the authors. After each task, a self-reporting questionnaire aimed at assess-
ing mental workload was given to subjects. These can be seen at Fig. A.11, A.13810
and A.17 in the Appendixes. Besides completing the questionnaires, in some
scenarios participants were required to fill in another scale providing an indica-
tion of their experienced mental workload (Fig. 8). This question was designed
for triangulation purposes with the assumption that only the person executing
a task can precisely self-assess its own experienced mental workload (Moustafa815
et al., 2017). Table 3 summarises the three experiments, the questionnaires
employed and the number of participants. It also mentions the mental work-
load assessment instrument that will be employed as baseline for comparison
purposes.
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Figure 8: Baseline self-reporting measure of Mental Workload






























3.4.1. Third-level classes at Technological University Dublin820
In the first two experiments (Ea and Eb, Table 3) students attended third-
level classes in the Technological University Dublin and filled either question-
naires A.11+A.13 or A.17 (Appendix A). The set of questionnaires were related
to the features being analysed at each experiment. In experiment Ea only fea-
tures of the NASA-TLX measurement technique were being investigated, while825
in experiment Eb a larger set of features was being considered for MWL mod-
elling and assessment. Therefore, two distinct sets of data were generated. In
total students were from 24 distinct countries (age 19-74, mean 30.9, std =
7.63) and attended four topics of the module ‘Research Methods’ in the Master
of Science: science, scientific method, research planning and literature review.830
These topics were delivered in three different forms during the semesters of the
3(Hart & Staveland, 1988).
4(Longo, 2014).
5(Hart, 2006).
6(Tsang & Velazquez, 1996).
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academic terms 2015-2018:
1. Traditional direct instruction, using slides projected to a white board;
2. Multimedia video of content. Transformation of the content of the slides
of 1 into a multimedia video projected to a white board;835
3. Constructivist collaborative activity added to 2.
Table 4 summarises the number of participants for each topic delivered in
experiments Ea and Eb, grouped by delivery method. It provides additional
figures related to the experiments carried out. Further details of these activi-
ties are not necessary for this research study, but the reader can find specific840
information in (Longo, 2018b; Longo & Orru, 2019).




Science [18, 62] 31 70 19
Scientific method [20, 46] 39 36 41
Research planning [10, 68] 43 45 41
Literature review [18, 57] 41 43 18
3.4.2. Information seeking web-based tasks
In the third experiment, nine information seeking web-based tasks of vary-
ing difficulty and demand (Table B.19 in the Appendix), were performed by
participants over three websites: Google, Wikipedia and Youtube. These web-845
sites were selected due to their popularity and assumption that participants
were familiar with their interfaces. In this way, situations of underload MWL
were expected to happen. If non-popular websites were chosen the chances of
spotting underload MWL would be reduced. In addition, the original interface
of each web-site was slightly manipulated in order to impose different MWL850
demands on participants interacting with them, leading to 9 tasks on the orig-
inal websites and 9 tasks on the modified websites (18 in total). 46 volunteers
performed all the tasks in a random order in different days, over 2 or 3 sessions
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of approximately 45/70 minutes each. Afterwards, the questions of Table A.17
were answered using a paper-based scale in the range [0..100] ∈ ℵ, partitioned855
in 3 regions delimited at 33 and 66. 405 valid instances were generated. Despite
not being necessary in this study, the reader can obtain more information on
the construction of this dataset in (Longo, 2018a, 2017; Longo & Dondio, 2015).
3.5. Summary of models and comparative metrics
Tables C.20, C.21 and C.22 in the Appendix list models built using the rea-860
soning approaches detailed in Sections 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3. Each reasoning approach
provides different configuration parameters that can impact results either posi-
tively or negatively. Thus, it is important to cover the highest possible number of
configurations. Some examples of parameters are heuristics for expert systems,
acceptability semantics for defeasible argumentation and fuzzy logic for fuzzy865
reasoning. Moreover, some types of data might require special configuration pa-
rameters, as it is the case in this study for the pairwise comparison procedure of
the NASA-TLX. To adapt their use fuzzy reasoning and expert systems imple-
ment the notion of rule weights at different stages of their reasoning processes,
while defeasible argumentation implements the notion of strength of arguments870
during the evaluation of conflicts between arguments. The inferential capacity
of such models was evaluated by analysing the sensitivity and three forms of va-
lidity of their inferences (scalar values). As suggested in Section 2.5, the three
forms of validity employed are convergent, face and concurrent validity. The
first has been assessed through an analysis of the correlation coefficients of the875
inferences produced by the designed models and the scores produced by selected
baseline instruments. The second has been assessed through an investigation of
the mean squared error (MSE7) of the inference of each designed model against
the mental workload scores reported by students using the scale of Fig. 8. The








, where Y is the vector of inferences made by the designed
models and X the vector of self-reported values.
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inferences produced by the designed models and an objective performance mea-
sure, in this case task completion time. Finally, sensitivity has been formally
assessed by analysing the variance of the distributions generated by inferences of
the designed non-monotonic reasoning models followed by a post hoc analysis.
Table 5 summarises comparative metrics, the statistical test associated to them885
and in which experiment they were employed. Before presenting the results
and the discussion of the study, Table 6 summarises experiments by reasoning
models and statistical tests applied.
Table 5: Comparative metrics, associated statistical tests and experiments that contain infor-
mation for their application.
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4. Results and discussion
Collected data was used to elicit models listed in Tables C.20, C.21 and C.22890
(Appendix C). The evaluation metrics of Table 5 are analysed in the following
sections.
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Table 6: Streamlined design of experiments under evaluation. Additional details of experi-
ments can be found in Table 3. Full list and detail of all the designed models can be seen in
Appendix C. Additional details on statistical tests can be seen in Table 5.
Experiment Ea
Experimental settings Models Analysis
Features: 6, Table A.11 Expert systems: E{1-4} Convergent validity
Task: Third level classes Fuzzy reasoning: FL{1-12} and FC{1-12} Face validity
Records: 230 Defeasible argumentation: A{1-4} Sensitive
Experiment Eb
Experimental settings Models Analysis
Features: 21, Table A.17 Expert systems: E{5-6} Convergent validity
Task: Third level classes Fuzzy reasoning: FL{13-18} and FC{13-18} Face validity
Records: 237 Defeasible argumentation: A{5-6} Sensitivity
Experiment Ec
Experimental settings Models Analysis
Features: 21, Table A.17 Expert systems: E{7-8} Convergent validity
Task: Seeking web-based Fuzzy reasoning: FL{19-24} and FC{19-24} Concurrent validity
Records: 405 Defeasible argumentation: A{7-8} Sensitive
4.1. Convergent validity
This property is aimed at determining whether, and to which extent, two
MWL inference models are correlated. It is the metric employed to achieve895
objective 1 (Section 3) and test its research hypotheses. The expectation is a
moderate to high correlation coefficient with state-of-the-art MWL measure-
ment techniques, which demonstrates that the designed models are in fact rep-
resenting and assessing the construct of MWL. Here, the Spearman correlation
coefficient was selected because of the non-normality of most of the distribu-900
tions of the inferences produced by the designed models. Formally, this was
confirmed by the Shapiro-Wilk test, which was not greater than the alpha level
set (alpha=0.05). Fig. D.27, p. 87, depicts the density plots of the inferences
produced by all models, while Fig. 9, 10 and 11 depict the Spearman correlation
coefficients of their inferences and those of the baseline instruments.905
From Fig. 9 it is possible to observe that the models designed for exper-































































































































































































Fuzzy (linear FMF) Fuzzy (Gaussian FMF) Expert systems Defeasible arg.
Figure 9: Spearmans correlation coefficients between NASA-TLX scores and inferences of
designed models for experiment Ea (p < 0.05). Models employing the pairwise comparison
information of the NASA-TLX are labelled with an inferior ., while those not employing it
are labelled with an inferior ?.
NASA-TLX baseline instrument (coefficients: 0.44 - 0.68). This demonstrates
the capacity of the investigated reasoning approaches to allow the development
of models to represent and assess the construct of MWL in experiment Ea,910
since they are in line with the baseline instrument. Models employing the pair-
wise comparison information of the NASA-TLX (labelled with an inferior .)
had in general a slightly higher correlation coefficient than analogous models
not employing this information (labelled with an inferior ?). Yet, a few excep-
tions can also be observed, such as: FL6× FL12, FC6× FC12 and E1× E2.915
This indicates that acceptable MWL inference models can be designed with less
information than the original NASA-TLX instrument.
Fig. 10 depicts the correlation coefficients of the designed models and se-
lected baseline instruments in experiment Eb: the Raw TLX in Fig. 10.a and
the Workload Profile in Fig. 10.b. Contrarily to results of experiment Ea, not920
all models could achieve a moderate/high convergent validity. In detail, fuzzy
models employing the mean of max defuzzification approach had the lowest
correlation coefficients (labelled with an inferior •) against both Raw TLX and
Workload Profile. In addition, there is a stark contrast when these are compared
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(b) Correlations against Workload Profile
Figure 10: Spearmans correlation coefficients between Raw TLX scores (a), Workload Profile
scores (b) and inferences of designed models for experiment Eb (p < 0.05). Inferior symbols are
used to represent: centroid defuzzification approach (◦), mean of max defuzzification approach
(•), fuzzy logic operator Zadeh (Z), Product (P) and  Lukasiewicz (L).
with an inferior ◦), be it among models of linear fuzzy membership functions
or Gaussian fuzzy membership functions. This is a strong indication that the
mean of max is not a suitable parameter within a model to assess MWL in
experiment Eb, regardless of the fuzzy operator or shape of the fuzzy member-
ship function employed. As for the FMFs, it is also possible to notice some930
differences when employing different fuzzy operators. For instance, models em-
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ploying the Zadeh and Product operator (labelled with an inferior (Z) and (P)
respectively) tend to have a higher correlation coefficient when employing Gaus-
sian FMFs (FL13 × FC13, FL14 × FC14, FL15 × FC15 and FL16 × FC16),
while models employing the  Lukasiewicz operator (labelled with an inferior (L))935
present the inverse behaviour, with similar to lower correlation coefficient for
models of Gaussian FMFs (FL17 × FC17 and FL18 × FC18). Among expert
system models, also note a lower correlation coefficient for E5 whose heuristic
is h1 (the average of surviving rules inferring the MWL level supported by the
greatest number of surviving rules) than E6 whose heuristic is h3 (average of940
all surviving rules). This suggests that the process of filtering surviving rules
(h1) instead of taking all of them into account (h3) for the final inference might
not be a good strategy. In other words, it also suggests that all surviving rules
might be of equal importance on the expert system reasoning process, regard-
less if their conclusions are the same or not of other surviving rules. Finally,945
defeasible argumentation models show very much alike correlation coefficients
among them, suggesting no difference exists between preferred and grounded
semantics in this experiment.
Fig. 11 depicts the results for experiment Ec. It is possible to observe
some similar results to the convergent validity in Eb: the same correlation trend950
between the designed models and the distinct baseline instruments (NASA-TLX
and WP), better correlation for expert systems employing heuristic h1 (E7)
instead of h3 (E8), no significant difference between defeasible argumentation
models and worse performance in general for fuzzy models employing the mean
of max defuzzification approach (labelled with an inferior •). However, the955
impact of the FMFs shape is not analogous as that of previous findings, in fact
it is not possible to observe a significant difference in their correlation coefficients
except for models FL24 and FC24.
In summary, it is worth highlighting some common findings and differences
related to the convergent validity of models across reasoning approaches. For960
instance, the expert system and defeasible argumentation reasoning approaches
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(b) Correlations against Workload Profile
NASA-TLX
(0.55)
Figure 11: Spearmans correlation coefficients between NASA-TLX scores (a), Workload Profile
scores (b) and inferences of designed models for experiment Ec (p < 0.05). Fuzzy models
employing the centroid defuzzification approach are labelled with an inferior ◦, while those
employing the mean of max are labelled with an inferior •.
ferent internal configurations of models and the different knowledge bases em-
ployed. This is demonstrated by the overall higher Spearman correlation coeffi-
cient between such models and baseline instruments across experiments (in the965
range 0.62 - 0.89 for defeasible argumentation and 0.45 - 0.89 for expert sys-
tems). Contrarily, parameters of the fuzzy reasoning models seem to lead to the
development of models that are more sensitive to the knowledge bases employed.
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Even when selecting the same fuzzy operator, the same defuzzification method
and the same fuzzy membership functions, fuzzy models can behave in stark970
contrast when compared to baseline instruments. For instance, while model
FC6 presents a high correlation coefficient (0.6) with NASA-TLX in experiment
Ea, the analogous model FC24 with same parameters, except for knowledge
base input, presents a low (0.15) correlation coefficient with NASA-TLX in ex-
periment Ec. This suggests that there is no fuzzy logic, defuzzification method975
or fuzzy membership functions better than others, having these to be selected
in a case by case analysis with the knowledge base. This can also be observed
by the similar correlation coefficients of fuzzy models in experiment Ea (overall
coefficients: 0.44 - 0.64) and contrasting correlation coefficients in experiments
Eb and Eb (respectively in ranges -0.21 - 0.45 and 0.02 - 0.57).980
4.2. Face validity
This property is aimed at determining the extent to which a measure of
MWL appears effective. It is one of the metrics employed to achieve objective
2 (Section 3) and test its research hypotheses. It was analysed according to
the mean square error (MSE) of produced inferences and self-reported MWL985
values (Fig. 8, p. 36). Fig. 12 and 13 depict the results for experiments
Ea and Eb respectively. Experiment Ec does not present information about
self-reported MWL values. Overall, the majority of models across reasoning
approaches could achieve similar or better MSE than baseline instruments. The
higher discrepancy, and worst performance (higher MSE), is given by fuzzy990
models employing the mean of max defuzzification approach (labelled with an
inferior •). Similarly to convergent validity, defeasible argumentation models
demonstrated robustness across the three experiments and expert system models
performed better when employing heuristic h2/h4 (the average/weighted average
of all surviving rules, labelled with an inferior +).995
As for experiment Ea, a significant difference has been found between models
employing the pairwise comparison information of the NASA-TLX and those not































































































































































































































































Fuzzy (linear FMF) Fuzzy (Gaussian FMF) Expert systems Defeasible arg.
NASA-TLX
Figure 12: Mean squared error of each designed model for experiment Ea and baseline instru-
ment NASA-TLX. Inferior symbols are used to represent: centroid defuzzification approach
(◦), mean of max defuzzification approach (•), heuristics h1 (−) and h3 (+), use (respectively
no use) of the the pairwise comparison information of the NASA-TLX (., respectively ?).
of 24% MSE when employing the pairwise comparison information (FL{1 −
6} × FL{7− 12}), while fuzzy models with Gaussian FMFs present a decrease1000
of 27.6% (FC{1 − 6} × FC{7 − 12}). A similar trend is observable in expert
system models, with a decrease of 19.5% (E2, E4 × E1, E3), and defeasible
argumentation models, with a decrease of 18.4% (A2, A4×A1, A3). In contrast
to convergent validity, the use of the information from the pairwise comparison
procedure demonstrated to have a stronger impact in face validity, even when1005
used in distinct ways by the investigated reasoning approaches. In other words,
despite not being essential to achieve high convergent validity with baseline
instruments, the information from the pairwise comparison procedure seems to
have a positive impact on the quality of the produced inferences according to
the analysis of face validity.1010
4.3. Concurrent validity
Aimed at determining the extent to which a model correlate with an objec-
tive performance measure, in this case task completion time, concurrent validity
was also assessed through an analysis of correlation coefficients between the de-








































































Fuzzy (linear FMF) Fuzzy (Gaussian FMF) Expert systems Defeasible arg.
RAW TLX Workload Profile
Figure 13: Mean squared error of each designed model for experiment Eb and baseline instru-
ments RAW TLX (lower dotted line at 212.57) and Workload Profile (upper dotted line at
274.91). Inferior symbols are used to represent: centroid (◦) and mean of max defuzzification
approach (•) and heuristics h1 (−) and h3 (+).
in the experiments Ea and Eb an objective performance measure has not been
gathered. From Fig. 14 it is possible to note that even the baseline instruments
do not have a high Spearman correlation coefficient with task completion time
(NASA-TLX: 0.28 and WP: 0.18), while most of the designed models present
a coefficient between 0.2 and 0.26, lying between the two baseline instruments.1020
This suggests that the investigated reasoning approaches, when set up with cer-
tain parameters, are as good as the baseline models. The exceptions presenting
a lower correlation coefficient are the fuzzy models of Gaussian FMFs employing
the mean of max defuzzification approach (FC20, FC22 and FC24) and the
expert system E7 employing heuristic h1. This trend is very similar to the one1025
depicted for convergent validity in Fig. 11, suggesting that these combinations
of parameters (Gaussian FMFs + mean of max for fuzzy models and heuristic
h1 for expert system models) do not help to create robust models of MWL. It is
also worth noting that fuzzy models FL20 and FL22 could achieve a favourable
correlation coefficient with task completion time, despite having low convergent1030
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Figure 14: Spearmans correlation coefficients between task completion time and the inferences
of designed models for experiment Ec (p < 0.05). Only 288 instances (out of 405 of experiment
Ec) have an associated time due to measurement errors. Inferior symbols are used to represent:
centroid (◦) and mean of max defuzzification approach (•) and heuristics h1 (−) and h3 (+).
4.4. Sensitivity
In line with other studies (Rubio et al., 2004; Longo, 2015), sensitivity was
assessed by performing an analysis of variance over the MWL distributions1035
generated by the designed models and the baseline instruments. The aim is
to investigate the capability of a model to discriminate significant variations in
MWL and changes in resource demand or task difficulty. In detail, the non-
parametric Kruskal-Wallis H test was performed over the MWL distributions
generated by each model. As mentioned before, normality of the distribution of1040
most of the models was not found according to the Shapiro-Wilk test. Hence,
the equivalent of one-way ANOVA could not be employed. Baseline instruments
and designed models for experiments Ea and Eb were not capable of rejecting the
null hypothesis of same distribution of MWL scalars across tasks (p < 0.01). In
these experiments, it can be argued that the performed tasks are of pedagogical1045
nature and are of similar complexity, since all classes are related to the same
general topic: ‘Research Methods’. Thus, it is difficult to create procedures that
can statistically and significantly affect overall MWL (Longo, 2018c).
As for experiment Ec, the null hypothesis of same distribution of MWL
48
Fuzzy (linear FMF) Fuzzy (Gaussian FMF) Expert systems Defeasible arg.


































































Figure 15: Sensitivity of MWL models designed for experiment Ec with Games-Howell post




= 153. Baseline instru-
ments are depicted in bold.
scalars across tasks was rejected. That means that there exist models that lead1050
to significantly different inferences when used to evaluate the MWL imposed by
the web-based tasks. However, the Kruskal-Wallis H test does not tell exactly
which pairs of tasks executed by participants are different from each other. Con-
sequently, a post hoc analysis was performed and the Games-Howell test was
chosen because of unequal variances of the distributions under analysis. Fig.1055
15 depicts how many pairs of tasks each model was capable of differentiating
at two significance levels (p < 0.05 and p < 0.01). As it can be observed, sim-
ilarly to convergent and concurrent validity, defeasible argumentation models
and expert system E8 outperformed the other models. When compared to the
baseline instruments, results for these models are in between the NASA-TLX1060
and the WP for both significance levels. Despite the high sensitivity of defeasi-
ble argumentation models, it is possible to observe a slight difference between
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them, with a better performance achieved by model A8 whose argumentation
semantics is the preferred semantics. Among fuzzy models, it is worth noting
that the best performance is given by FL20 and FL22. It strengthens the re-1065
sults of concurrent validity, suggesting that models of low convergent validity
might produce satisfactory inferences. Another interesting observation comes
from model FC19. In spite of presenting similar convergent and concurrent
validity with its linear counterpart (FL19), in this case its sensitivity was su-
perior, being close to or better than WP, while FL19 was always distant from1070
the baseline instruments. It shows that Gaussian FMFs can provide more sen-
sitive models when employed with certain fuzzy operators and defuzzification
approaches (in this case Zadeh and centroid respectively). Other fuzzy models
demonstrated to have poor sensitivity, underperforming the baseline models. In
detail, as expected by convergent and face validity analysis of experiment Ec,1075
fuzzy models of Gaussian FMFs employing the mean of max defuzzification ap-
proach led to the worst performance, not being able to statistically differentiate
between any pair of tasks.
4.5. Internal configurations of models and interpretations
Quantifications of the validity and sensitivity of the developed models sug-1080
gest that, in general, the investigated reasoning approaches can be successfully
employed for mental workload modelling and assessment. Nonetheless, the anal-
ysis across different experiments and evaluation metrics seems to indicate a
contrasting performance when particular parameters of distinct reasoning tech-
niques are employed. Table 7 summarises average results across experiments for1085
the designed models grouped by internal parameters. Some results are in fact a
single value, and so, have no standard deviation reported. For the other cases,
Figures 16 - 22 depict the respective boxplots.
Most negative impacts seemed to be caused by the application of the mean of
max defuzzification approach by fuzzy models and heuristics for the refinement1090
of surviving rules by expert system models (h1/h2). These lead to the devel-
opment of models that, in average, underperformed in all evaluation metrics
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Table 7: Average and standard deviation of evaluation metrics in all experiments by specific
parameters of each reasoning approach. Bold numbers are used to represent the best results




Average Validity (σ) Avg. Sensitivity (σ)
p < 0.05 / p < 0.01Convergent Face Concurrent
Fuzzy
reasoning
Mean of Max 0.27 (0.25) 622.28 (277.81) 0.11 (0.12) 5.3 (6.0) / 2.16 (2.4)
Centroid 0.46 (0.15) 282.07 (44.71) 0.23 (0.01) 8.3 (4.8) / 3.8 (1.6)
Linear 0.37 (0.25) 521.8 (316.44) 0.23 (0.02) 7.6 (3.8) / 3.8 (0.7)
Gaussian 0.38 (0.21) 382.89 (172.95) 0.11 (0.12) 6 (6.9) / 2.16 (2.7)
Rule weight 0.57 (0.06) 324.58 (121.82) - -
No rule weight 0.57 (0.05) 434.21 (170.65) - -
Expert
systems
h1/h2 0.62 (0.09) 490.53 (231.03) 0.1 (-) 9 (-) / 4 (-)
h3/h4 0.75 (0.09) 262.85 (27.62) 0.23 (-) 21 (-) / 14 (-)
h1/h3 0.69 (0.02) 333.27 (92.44) - -
h2/h4 0.67 (0.02) 273.09 (58.92) - -
Defeasible
argument.
Preferred 0.77 (0.07) 255.29 (33.90) 0.25 (-) 23 (-) / 16 (-)
Grounded 0.76 (0.09) 259.27 (33.86) 0.24 (-) 21 (-) / 15 (-)
Strength of arg. 0.7 (0.0) 219.31 (2.02) - -
Binary relation 0.68 (0.02) 268.4 (6.2) - -
(validity, sensitivity) and, in the case of fuzzy models, also tend to have a much
higher standard deviation when compared to their counterparts: the centroid
approach and the heuristics h3/h4. The explanation for such discrepancy might1095
lie in the role of the mean of max defuzzification approach and the role of the
heuristics h1/h2 in their respective models. Note that despite being employed
by distinct reasoning techniques these roles might in fact be related. While the
mean of max defuzzification approach selects only the rules whose conclusion(s)
have the highest degree of truth, the refinement of surviving rules by heuristics1100
h1/h2 discards rules not inferring the MWL level supported by the greatest
number of surviving rules. Thus, these can be seen as apparently unsuccessful
attempts to resolve conflicts among rules by selecting some of them believed to
be suitable for inferring a final MWL scalar.
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Figure 16: Boxplots of evaluation metrics by defuzzification approach of fuzzy reasoning
models.
Figure 17: Boxplots of evaluation metrics by application of rule weight or not on fuzzy rea-
soning models.
Figure 18: Boxplots of evaluation metrics by heuristics applying weighted average of argu-
ments (h2/h4) and heuristics applying regular average of arguments (h1/h3) on expert system
models.
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Figure 19: Boxplots of evaluation metrics by heuristics averaging all arguments (h1/h2) and
heuristics averaging a subset of arguments (h3/h4) on expert system models.
Figure 20: Boxplots of evaluation metrics by acceptability semantics on defeasible argumen-
tation models.
Figure 21: Boxplots of evaluation metrics by attack relation on defeasible argumentation
models.
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Figure 22: Boxplots of evaluation metrics by fuzzy membership function shape of fuzzy rea-
soning models.
In contrast, it is worth noting the robustness of defeasible argumentation,1105
with only a slight performance variance among its models across distinct eval-
uation metrics and experiments. This suggests that defeasible argumentation
has a greater capacity of resolving conflicts among rules, thus optimally han-
dling non-monotonicity. It is also interesting to observe the small differences
between results generated by models employing the preferred semantics and1110
the grounded semantics. These semantics diverge when multiple extensions are
generated by the preferred semantics, since the grounded semantics can only
output a single extension. In case of multiple extensions the one(s) with the
highest cardinality is (are) selected. Similarly to the heuristics h1/h2 and mean
of max defuzzification approach, this selection of an extension among multiple1115
ones is also an attempt of conflict resolution. However, in the case of defeasible
argumentation, produced results are stronger, suggesting that the conflict res-
olution strategy of defeasible argumentation is likely stronger than the conflict
resolution strategy of fuzzy reasoning and expert systems.
From Table 7 it is possible to inspect and further spot other differences1120
between particular parameters employed by reasoning models. For instance,
the impact of using the extra information from the pairwise comparison of the
NASA-TLX is similar and, as expected, positive across all reasoning approaches.
This use is made by fuzzy models employing rule weights, expert system mod-
els employing heuristics h2/h4 and defeasible argumentation models employing1125
strength of arguments. In these cases the convergent validity is preserved and
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the mean squared error between produced inferences and self-reported MWL
values (face validity) is reduced. This can be observed in Fig. 17, 18 and 21
which compare models using and not using the information from the pairwise
comparison. At last, the difference between linear and Gaussian FMFs on fuzzy1130
models is not absolute. While models of Gaussian FMFs present analogous av-
erage results for convergent validity and better average results for face validity,
linear models seem to have better average results for concurrent validity and
sensitivity. This observation can also be supported by the boxplot comparison
of Fig. 22. Such mixed results do not allow the drawing of conclusions in regards1135
to the impact of the shape of FMFs on MWL modelling and assessment.
4.6. Discussion
The overall medium to high degree of convergent validity of the investigated
models indicated that their inferences can be considered valid, as per alternate
hypothesis of objective 1 (Section 3). As a consequence, the findings from the1140
analysis of the face validity, concurrent validity and sensitivity can be considered
consistent, quantifying the extent by which the designed reasoning models can
represent MWL. This analysis seems to also indicate a better inferential capac-
ity of the defeasible argumentation models, or in this case, a better capacity of
producing inferences with improved face validity, improved concurrent validity1145
and improved sensitivity. This conclusion was further supported by the exam-
ination of average results of the designed models when grouped by their con-
figuration parameters. Defeasible argumentation models presented the lowest
standard deviations of such averages, demonstrating robustness across its inter-
nal configurations. This advantage was inspected over two other non-monotonic1150
reasoning approaches namely fuzzy reasoning and expert systems. It also held
despite the underlying knowledge bases employed. Comparable results were
only achieved by expert systems employing one of the designed heuristics for
conflict resolution. This similarity is likely due to the lower amount of conflict-
ual rules employed within knowledge bases when elicited with real-world data.1155
For example, the knowledge base solely built upon the NASA-TLX attributes
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(Appendix A.1) can only have up to six arguments that can be activated given
input data. Thus, the requirement of further comparisons for knowledge bases
of higher topological complexity might be reasonable. Nonetheless, defeasible
argumentation models consistently showed a higher correlation with baseline1160
models, a significantly lower mean squared error against the subjective percep-
tion of mental workload rated by participants, an analogous concurrent validity
to the baseline models and a sensitivity in-between the NASA-TLX and WP
models. This suggests the potential of defeasible argumentation as a modelling
tool for knowledge bases characterised by uncertainty, partiality and conflictual1165
information. A summary of the comparison of defeasible argumentation against
fuzzy reasoning and expert systems across experiments is listed in Table 8 for
convergent validity and Table 9 for the other evaluation metrics. Based on these
the acceptance statuses of Hypotheses 1 and 2 (Section 3) are listed in Table
10.1170
Table 8: Status of reasoning approaches according to convergent validity. A X means medium




Expert systems X X X
Fuzzy reasoning X Partially Partially
Defeasible argumentation X X X
Table 9: Status of defeasible argumentation (DA) compared to fuzzy reasoning (FR) and
expert systems (ES) according to sensitivity, face validity and concurrent validity across the
3 experimental settings. Comparison symbols are used to represent equal (=), better (<) and
considerably better () results on average for models built upon defeasible argumentation.
A (−) means not applicable. The reasoning approach employed by the best-performing model
is listed in the last row.
Comparison approach
Sensitivity Face validity Concurrent validity
Ea Eb Ec Ea Eb Ec Ea Eb Ec
Expert systems = = < < < − − − <
Fuzzy reasoning = =  < < − − − <
Best model − − DA DA ES/DA − − − FR/DA
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Table 10: Acceptance status of the hypotheses of the research study.
Hypothesis 1
Non-monotonic reasoning models will demonstrate moderate to
high convergent validity with baseline instruments.
Acceptance status
Accepted by defeasible argumentation and expert systems. Par-
tially accepted by fuzzy reasoning, with some models presenting
low convergent validity.
Hypothesis 2
Defeasible argumentation models will demonstrate higher sen-
sitivity, higher concurrent validity and higher face validity than
fuzzy reasoning and expert system models.
Acceptance status
Partially accepted. On average sensitivity and validity are
consistently better for defeasible argumentation. By individ-
ual models, defeasible argumentation has better results overall,
but expert systems and fuzzy reasoning can produce results of
equivalent face and concurrent validity on certain experiments.
5. Conclusion and future work
This study presented an extensive comparison of non-monotonic rule-based
reasoning techniques for the practical problem of mental workload modelling.
These techniques are promising not only because they can approximate the in-
ferential capacity of a knowledge representation and reasoning application, but1175
they also offer a flexible approach for translating different knowledge bases and
beliefs of domain experts into computational rules. Furthermore, they sup-
port the creation of models that can be falsified, replicated and extended, thus
enhancing the understanding of the construct of mental workload itself and
possibly other applications of interest. Such advantages, for instance, are not1180
provived by data-driven techniques, even the ones able to produce interpretable
solutions. Hence, if they are to be used in other domains of application and by
other domain experts, it is necessary to perform a meticulous – and not per-
formed before – examination of one of their crucial aspects namely inferential ca-
pacity. In particular, the inferential capacity of expert systems, non-monotonic1185
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fuzzy reasoning and defeasible argumentation models was examined. A set of
models, for each reasoning approach, was created following the structures em-
ployed in the literature. For instance, expert systems adopted the common
two internal components: a knowledge base and an inference engine (Durkin
& Durkin, 1998). Fuzzy reasoning models followed the structure of a typical1190
Mamdani fuzzy inference process (Mamdani, 1974). Defeasible argumentation
models were constructed based on a 5-layer schema upon which argumentation
systems are typically built (Longo, 2016). Nonetheless, the implementation of
the non-monotonicity property was not straightforward for expert systems and
fuzzy reasoning. The former required different heuristics for aggregating rules1195
and inferring MWL as a numerical index. Usual conflict resolution strategies of
expert systems could not be employed due to the nature of the domain, which
required all the reasoning to be made in a single step. The latter, fuzzy rea-
soning, had non-monotonicity implemented by using Possibility Theory, having
truth values, named possibility and necessity, associated to each piece of infor-1200
mation. Possibility allowed fuzzy reasoning models to determine the extent to
which data fails to refute its truth, while necessity represented the usual truth
values of fuzzy logic. Besides such adaptations, the investigation of configu-
ration parameters was also performed for each reasoning technique for tuning
purposes.1205
Findings indicated how models or a subset of models built upon the three
reasoning techniques had a good convergent validity with three selected base-
line models of mental workload: the NASA Task Load Index (Hart & Stave-
land, 1988), its RAW extension (Hart, 2006) and the Workload Profile (Wick-
ens, 1991). The designed inferential models were elicited with three knowledge1210
bases, three distinct sets of data and assessed according to common evaluation
metrics of MWL, namely sensitivity and validity. Findings revealed a good con-
vergent validity against baselines, suggesting how constructed reasoning models
can actually model the underlying construct: mental workload. In detail, fuzzy
reasoning presented varied results due to the higher number of available configu-1215
ration parameters, providing greater flexibility but limiting its applicability and
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use by domain experts. Equivalently, applicability and use by domain experts
is also limited in expert systems due to varied results. Some of these are inferior
to the results of defeasible argumentation when employing one set of heuristics,
but similar when employing the complementary set of heuristics. Hence, the1220
analysis of knowledge bases of topologies of higher complexity is a possible di-
rection of future research. Finally, defeasible argumentation showed additional
robustness compared to fuzzy reasoning and expert system models according to
overall validity and sensitivity, holding despite the parameters being employed
and underlying knowledge base. The originality of this research lies in the quan-1225
tification of the impact of defeasible argumentation. It is a result of a thorough
empirical research in two real-world experimental settings employing primary
data gathered from humans, and three knowledge bases produced with the aid
of human experts. All these elements provide some generalisability to the results
and also help on identifying situations in which the non-monotonic reasoning1230
approaches are likely better or worse to each other. It does not verify which
of them is ultimately better. Other representations of fuzzy reasoning systems
could give better outcomes, the same way other representations of defeasible
argumentation and expert systems could also give better outcomes. However,
this research has produced an extensive number of inferential models of differ-1235
ent configurations. Hence, it contributes to the field of logic and non-monotonic
reasoning by better situating defeasible argumentation among similar reasoning
approaches and illustrating a replicable comparison process between them. This
comparison has been performed using an application whose knowledge bases are
formed by uncertain information. In spite of that, quantitative metrics of eval-1240
uation could still be employed since these were pre-defined in the literature of
mental workload. Because of that, this study is even more significant to the field
of non-monotonic reasoning, showing how a quantitative evaluation process can
be performed in a uncertain context.
Future work will concentrate on investigating knowledge bases of different1245
and increased topological complexities. In addition, this study is limited for
being performed in a single domain of application. Comparisons performed in
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other areas might enhance results and extend its generalisability. One possi-
ble adequate field of comparison in the domain of knowledge representation is
computational trust modelling (Parsons et al., 2010; Dondio & Longo, 2014,1250
2011). In order to improve the acceptance of defeasible argumentation for non-
monotonic activities, the investigation of its explanatory capacity is also sug-
gested. Higher explanatory capacity might lead to higher levels of adoption not
only in the field of knowledge representation and reasoning but also in areas
such as health-care and autonomous vehicles. Previous work (Rizzo & Longo,1255
2018) have attempted to perform a preliminary qualitative analysis of defeasible
argumentation and non-monotonic fuzzy reasoning in terms of a few properties
for explainability analysis from explainable AI. However, explainability is a com-
plex concept and additional examination should be performed so as to assess the
usability and effectiveness of explanations provided. Another line of research1260
may be pursued by increasing the explanatory capacity of models built upon
defeasible argumentation through the addition of new explainable layers. For
instance the argumentation semantics designed in (Fan & Toni, 2015) for giving
explanations to arguments. Lastly, the application of hybrid reasoning tech-
niques, such as neuro-fuzzy systems (Nauck et al., 1997), genetic fuzzy systems1265
(Cordo´n et al., 2004) and fuzzy argumentation (Dondio, 2017) is recommended.
Their investigation might lead to possible alternative solutions capable of pre-
senting strong inferential and explanatory capacity for non-monotonic reasoning
problems.
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Appendix A. Knowledge bases
In this appendix three knowledge-bases in the field of human mental work-
load are described. These knowledge-bases are built upon subjective measures
of mental workload measurement. In other words, they rely on the subjective1615
feedback (in this case questionnaires) provided by humans engaging with an
underlying task. For each knowledge base the following are defined:
1. Features: A set of features (attributes) believed to influence mental work-
load and its assessment (with the aid of an expert);
2. Questions: A set of questions for quantitatively quantifying the above1620
features;
3. Mapping: A map between natural language terms and numerical ranges
(for instance “low = [0, 33]”).
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4. Inferential rules: A list of inferential IF-THEN rules employing natural
language terms of item 3.1625
5. Contradictions: A list of contradictions and exceptions for rules of item 4
in three possible forms:
- IF Rule A THEN not Rule B.
- Rule A and Rule B cannot coexist.
- IF premises THEN not Rule A.1630
6. Graphical representation: A graphical representation of rules and contra-
dictions of items 4 and 5.
At the end of the section a set of fuzzy membership functions is also provided.
These can be used to compute the membership grade of natural language terms
(defined in 3).1635
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Appendix A.1. Knowledge base A
Table A.11: Questions associated to the NASA Task Load Index and employed as features of
the knowledge-base A (Hart & Staveland, 1988).
Feature Question
Mental demand
How much mental and perceptual activity was required (e.g.
thinking, deciding, calculating, remembering, looking, searching,
etc.)? Was the task easy or demanding, simple or complex, exact-
ing or forgiving?
Physical demand
How much physical activity was required (e.g. pushing, pulling,
turning, controlling, activating, etc.)? Was the task easy or de-
manding, slow or brisk, slack or strenuous, restful or laborious?
Temporal demand
How much time pressure did you feel due to the rate or pace at
which the tasks or task elements occurred? Was the pace slow
and leisurely or rapid and frantic?
Effort
How hard did you have to work (mentally and physically) to ac-
complish your level of performance?
Performance
How successful do you think you were in accomplishing the goals,
of the task set by the experimenter (or yourself)? How satisfied
were you with your performance in accomplishing these goals?
Frustration
How insecure, discouraged, irritated, stressed and annoyed versus
secure, gratified, content, relaxed and complacent did you feel
during the task?
Table A.12: Natural language terms and associated numerical ranges employed to reason with
features in knowledge base A.
Features MWL
Terms Range Terms Range
Low [0, 33) Underload [0, 33)
Medium Lower [33, 50) Fitting minus load [33, 50)
Medium Upper [50, 67) Fitting plus load [50, 67)
High [67, 100] Overload [67, 100]
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Table A.13: The pairwise comparison procedure of the Nasa Task Load Index instrument
(Hart & Staveland, 1988). This comparison is employed for the definition of weights for each
feature. The number of times a feature is selected represents its respective weight.
Pair feature 1 feature 2
1 temporal demand  OR  frustration
2 performance  OR  mental demand
3 mental demand  OR  physical demand
4 frustration  OR  performance
5 temporal demand  OR  effort
6 physical demand  OR  frustration
7 performance  OR  temporal demand
8 mental demand  OR  effort
9 physical demand  OR  temporal demand
10 frustration  OR  effort
11 physical demand  OR  performance
12 temporal demand  OR  mental demand
13 effort  OR  physical demand
14 frustration  OR  mental demand
15 performance  OR  effort
Table A.14: (fuzzy) IF-THEN rules for knowledge base A designed by a domain expert believed
to influence mental workload and its assessment.
Label Internal structure
MD1 low mental demand THEN underload mwl
MD2 medium lower mental demand THEN fitting minus load mwl
MD3 medium upper mental demand THEN fitting plus load mwl
MD4 high mental demand THEN overload mwl
TD1 low temporal demand THEN underload mwl
TD2 medium lower temporal demand THEN fitting minus load mwl
TD3 medium upper temporal demand THEN fitting plus load mwl
TD4 high temporal demand THEN overload mwl
EF1 low effort THEN underload mwl
EF2 medium lower effort THEN fitting minus load mwl
EF3 medium upper effort THEN fitting plus load mwl
EF4 high effort THEN overload mwl
PF1 low performance THEN overload mwl
PF2 medium lower performance THEN fitting plus load mwl
PF3 medium upper performance THEN fitting minus load mwl
PF4 high performance THEN underload mwl
FR1 low frustration THEN underload mwl
FR2 high frustration THEN overload mwl
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Table A.15: Contradictions associated to knowledge base A designed by a domain expert
believed to influence mental workload and its assessment.
Label Internal structure
R1 IF high performance THEN not FR2
R2 IF low performance THEN not FR1
C1 MD1 and FR2 cannot coexist
C2 TD1 and FR2 cannot coexist
C3 FR1 and MD4 cannot coexist
C4 FR1 and TD4 cannot coexist
C5 FR1 and EF4 cannot coexist
C6 EF1 and FR2 cannot coexist
C7 EF1 and MD4 cannot coexist
R3 IF EF4 THEN not MD1
Figure A.23: Graphical representation of knowledge base A. Nodes can represent (fuzzy)
IF-THEN rules or premises of contradictions. Arrows represent contradictions between two
rules.
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Appendix A.2. Knowledge base B
Features employed in this knowledge base are the same ones listed in Table
A.17. Natural language terms and associated numerical ranges are the same ones
listed in Table A.12. The remaining information for modelling and assessing1640
mental workload by this knowledge base are described in the following tables
and figures.
Table A.16: (fuzzy) IF-THEN rules for knowledge base B designed by domain expert for in-
ference of mental workload. The same principle of mental demand applies to the attributes
temporal demand (TD), physical demand (PD), solving and deciding (SD), selection of
response (SR), task and space (TS), verbal material (VM), visual resources (VR),
auditory resources (AR), manual response (MR), speech response (SPR), effort (EF),
parallelism (PR), and context bias (CB), forming 52 other rules.
Label Internal structure
MD1 IF low mental demand THEN Underload
MD2 IF medium lower mental demand THEN Fitting minus
MD3 IF medium upper mental demand THEN Fitting plus
MD4 IF high mental demand THEN Overload
PS1 IF low frustration THEN Underload
PS2 IF high frustration THEN Overload
MV1 IF low motivation THEN Underload
PK1 IF low past knowledge THEN Overload
PK2 IF high past knowledge THEN Underload
SK1 IF low skills THEN Overload
SK2 IF high skills THEN Underload
PF1 IF low performance THEN Overload
PF2 IF medium lower perf. THEN Fitting minus
PF3 IF medium upper perf. THEN Fitting plus
PF4 IF high performance THEN Underload
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Table A.17: Features and respective questions for their measurement employed in knowledge
base B. They were originally proposed in (Longo, 2014).
Feature Question
Mental demand
How much mental and perceptual activity was required (e.g., thinking,
deciding, calculating, remembering, looking, searching, etc.)? Was the
task easy (low mental demand) or complex (high mental demand)?
Temporal demand
How much time pressure did you feel due to the rate or pace at which the
tasks or task elements occurred? Was the pace slow and leisurely (low
temporal demand) or rapid and frantic (high temporal demand)?
Effort How much conscious mental effort or concentration was required? Was
the task almost automatic (low effort) or it required total attention (high
effort)?
Performance
How successful do you think you were in accomplishing the goal of the
task? How satisfied were you with your performance in accomplishing the
goal?
Frustration
How secure, gratified, content, relaxed and complacent (low psychological
stress) versus insecure, discouraged, irritated, stressed and annoyed (high
psychological stress) did you feel during the task?
Solving and deciding
How much attention was required for activities like remembering, problem-
solving, decision-making and perceiving (eg. detecting, recognizing and
identifying objects)?
Selection of response How much attention was required for selecting the proper response channel
and its execution? (manual - keyboard/mouse, or speech - voice)
Task and space How much attention was required for spatial processing (spatially pay
attention around you)?
Verbal material How much attention was required for verbal material (eg. reading or pro-
cessing linguistic material or listening to verbal conversations)?
Visual resources How much attention was required for executing the task based on the
information visually received (through eyes)?
Auditory resources How much attention was required for executing the task based on the
information auditorily received (ears)?
Manual Response How much attention was required for manually respond to the task (eg.
keyboard/mouse usage)?
Speech response How much attention was required for producing the speech response(eg.
engaging in a conversation or talk or answering questions)?
Context bias
How often interruptions on the task occurred? Were distractions (mo-
bile, questions, noise, etc.) not important (low context bias) or did they
influence your task (high context bias)?
Past knowledge How much experience do you have in performing the task or similar tasks
on the same website?
Skill Did your skills have no influence (low) or did they help to execute the task
(high)?
Motivation Were you motivated to complete the task?
Parallelism Did you perform just this task (low parallelism) or were you doing other
parallel tasks (high parallelism) (eg. multiple tabs/windows/programs)?
Arousal Were you aroused during the task? Were you sleepy, tired (low arousal)
or fully awake and activated (high arousal)?
Task difficult
1
8 ((solving/deciding) + (auditory resources) + (manual response) +
(speech response ) + (selection of response) + (task/space) +
(verbal material ) + (visual resources))
Physical demand
How much physical activity was required (e.g. pushing, pulling, turning,
controlling, activating, etc.)? Was the task easy or demanding, slow or
brisk, slack or strenuous, restful or laborious?
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Table A.18: Contradictions for knowledge base B designed by domain expert for inference of
mental workload.
Label Internal structure
AD1a IF low arousal and low task difficulty THEN not PF4
AD1b IF low arousal and low task difficulty THEN not PF3
AD1c IF low arousal and low task difficulty THEN not PF2
AD2a IF low arousal and high task difficulty THEN not PF4
AD2b IF low arousal and high task difficulty THEN not PF3
AD2c IF low arousal and high task difficulty THEN not PF2
AD3a IF medium lower arousal and low task difficulty THEN not PF1
AD3b IF medium lower arousal and low task difficulty THEN not PF4
AD4a IF medium lower arousal and high task difficulty THEN not PF1
AD4b IF medium lower arousal and high task difficulty THEN not PF3
AD4c IF medium lower arousal and high task difficulty THEN not PF4
AD4d IF medium upper arousal and high task difficulty THEN not PF1
AD4e IF medium upper arousal and high task difficulty THEN not PF3
AD4f IF medium upper arousal and high task difficulty THEN not PF4
AD5a IF medium upper arousal and low task difficulty THEN not PF1
AD5b IF medium upper arousal and low task difficulty THEN not PF2
AD5c IF medium upper arousal and low task difficulty THEN not PF3
AD5d IF high arousal and low task difficulty THEN not PF1
AD5e IF high arousal and low task difficulty THEN not PF2
AD5f IF high arousal and low task difficulty THEN not PF3
AD6a IF high arousal and high task difficulty THEN not PF2
AD6b IF high arousal and high task difficulty THEN not PF3
AD6c IF high arousal and task difficulty THEN not PF4
MV2 IF low motivation THEN not EF3
MV3 IF low motivation THEN not EF4
MV4 IF high motivation THEN not EF1
MV5 IF high motivation THEN not EF2
DS1 IF high task difficulty and high skills THEN not EF4
DS2
IF high task difficulty and high skills and low effort THEN not
PF1
DS3
IF high task difficulty and high skills and medium lower effort
THEN not PF1
DS4
IF high task difficulty and high skills and medium upper effort
THEN not PF1
R1 MD1 and SD4 cannot coexist
R2 MD4 and SD1 cannot coexist
R3 PK1 and SK2 cannot coexist
R4 PK2 and SK1 cannot coexist
R5 PK1 and EF1 cannot coexist
R6 PK2 and EF4 cannot coexist
R7 SK1 and EF1 cannot coexist
R8 SK2 and EF4 cannot coexist
R9 CB4 and PS1 cannot coexist
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Figure A.24: Graphical representation of knowledge base B. Nodes can represent (fuzzy)
IF-THEN rules or premises of contradictions. Arrows represent contradictions between two
rules.
Appendix A.3. Knowledge base C
This knowledge base is a mix of knowledge bases A and B. The elements
required by it are defined as following:1645
• The features employed are listed in Table A.17.
• Natural language terms and associated numerical ranges are listed in Table
A.12.
• IF-THEN rules are listed in Table A.16.
• Contradictions are from both Tables A.18 and A.15.1650
• The graphical representation of the knowledge base is depicted in Fig.
A.25.
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Figure A.25: Graphical representation of knowledge base C. Nodes can represent (fuzzy)
IF-THEN rules or premises of contradictions. Arrows represent contradictions between two
rules.
82
Appendix A.4. Fuzzy membership functions
Fig. A.26 depicts the possible fuzzy membership functions employed for
modelling the natural language terms listed in Table A.121655
(a) Triangular MWL levels (b) Triangular feature levels
(c) Trapezoid and triangular MWL levels (d) Trapezoid and triangular feature levels
(e) Gaussian MWL levels (f) Gaussian feature levels
Figure A.26: Employed fuzzy membership functions for different MWL and feature levels.
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Appendix B. List of information seeking web-based tasks
Table B.19: List of experimental web-based tasks employed for measurement of imposed
mental workload. Each website had two interfaces: the original one and one slightly modified,
generating two tasks for each description. These tasks were first designed and employed in
(Longo, 2014).
Task Description Task condition Web-site
T1.1, T1.2






No goals, no time pressure Wikipedia
T3.1, T3.2
Find out the difference (in years) be-
tween the year of the foundation of the
Apple Computer Inc. and the year of
the 14th FIFA world cup
Dual-task and mental arithmetical
calculations Google
T4.1, T4.2
Find out the difference (in years) be-
tween the foundation of the Microsoft
Corp. & the year of the 23rd Olympic
games
Dual-task and mental arithmetical
calculations Google
T5.1, T5.2
Find out the year of birth of the 1st
wife of the founder of playboy
Single task + time pressure (2-min




Find out the name of the man (inter-
preted by Johnny Deep) in the video
www.youtube.com/watch?v=FfTPS-TFQ_c
Constant demand on visual and
auditory modalities. Participant
can replay the video if required
Youtube
T7.1.T7.2
a) Play the song www.youtube.com/
watch?v=Rb5G1eRIj6c. While listening
to it, b) find out the result of the poly-
nomial equation p(x), with x = 7 con-
tained in the wikipedia article http:
//it.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polinomi
Demand on visual modality and
inference on auditory modality.
The song is extremely irritating Wikipedia
T8.1, T8.2
Find out how many times Stewie
jumps in the video www.youtube.com/
watch?v=TSe9gbdkQ8s
Demand on visual resource + ex-
ternal interference: user is dis-
tracted twice & can replay video
Youtube
T9.1, T9.2
Find out the age of the blue fish
in the video www.youtube.com/watch?v=
H4BNbHBcnDI
Demand on visual and auditory
modality, plus time-pressure: 150-
sec limit. User can replay the
video. There is no answer.
Youtube
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Appendix C. List of models built using each reasoning approach




Layer 1 Layer 2 Layer 3 Layer 4 Layer 5
Arguments Conflicts Attack relation Semantics Accrual
A1 Ea KB1 (Appendix A.1) Binary Grounded average
A2 Ea KB1 (Appendix A.1) Strength of arg. Grounded w. average
A3 Ea KB1 (Appendix A.1) Binary Preferred card. + average
A4 Ea KB1 (Appendix A.1) Strength of arg. Preferred card. + w. average
A5 Eb KB2 (Appendix A.2) Binary Grounded average
A6 Eb KB2 (Appendix A.2) Binary Preferred card. + average
A7 Ec KB3 (Appendix A.3) Binary Grounded average
A8 Ec KB3 (Appendix A.3) Binary Preferred card. + average








E1 KB1 h1 Ea
E2 KB1 h2 Ea
E3 KB1 h3 Ea
E4 KB1 h4 Ea
E5 KB2 h1 Eb
E6 KB2 h3 Eb
E7 KB3 h1 Ec
E8 KB3 h3 Ec
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FL1 Zadeh Centroid no KB1 Triangular Ea
FL2 Zadeh Mean of max no KB1 Triangular Ea
FL3 Product Centroid no KB1 Triangular Ea
FL4 Product Mean of max no KB1 Triangular Ea
FL5  Lukasiewicz Centroid no KB1 Triangular Ea
FL6  Lukasiewicz Mean of max no KB1 Triangular Ea
FL7 Zadeh Centroid yes KB1 Triangular Ea
FL8 Zadeh Mean of max yes KB1 Triangular Ea
FL9 Product Centroid yes KB1 Triangular Ea
FL10 Product Mean of max yes KB1 Triangular Ea
FL11  Lukasiewicz Centroid yes KB1 Triangular Ea
FL12  Lukasiewicz Mean of max yes KB1 Triangular Ea
FL13 Zadeh Centroid no KB2 Trapezoid Eb
FL14 Zadeh Mean of max no KB2 Trapezoid Eb
FL15 Product Centroid no KB2 Trapezoid Eb
FL16 Product Mean of max no KB2 Trapezoid Eb
FL17  Lukasiewicz Centroid no KB2 Trapezoid Eb
FL18  Lukasiewicz Mean of max no KB2 Trapezoid Eb
FL19 Zadeh Centroid no KB3 Trapezoid Ec
FL20 Zadeh Mean of max no KB3 Trapezoid Ec
FL21 Product Centroid no KB3 Trapezoid Ec
FL22 Product Mean of max no KB3 Trapezoid Ec
FL23  Lukasiewicz Centroid no KB3 Trapezoid Ec
FL24  Lukasiewicz Mean of max no KB3 Trapezoid Ec
FC1 Zadeh Centroid no KB1 Gaussian Ea
FC2 Zadeh Mean of max no KB1 Gaussian Ea
FC3 Product Centroid no KB1 Gaussian Ea
FC4 Product Mean of max no KB1 Gaussian Ea
FC5  Lukasiewicz Centroid no KB1 Gaussian Ea
FC6  Lukasiewicz Mean of max no KB1 Gaussian Ea
FC7 Zadeh Centroid yes KB1 Gaussian Ea
FC8 Zadeh Mean of max yes KB1 Gaussian Ea
FC9 Product Centroid yes KB1 Gaussian Ea
FC10 Product Mean of max yes KB1 Gaussian Ea
FC11  Lukasiewicz Centroid yes KB1 Gaussian Ea
FC12  Lukasiewicz Mean of max yes KB1 Gaussian Ea
FC13 Zadeh Centroid no KB2 Gaussian Eb
FC14 Zadeh Mean of max no KB2 Gaussian Eb
FC15 Product Centroid no KB2 Gaussian Eb
FC16 Product Mean of max no KB2 Gaussian Eb
FC17  Lukasiewicz Centroid no KB2 Gaussian Eb
FC18  Lukasiewicz Mean of max no KB2 Gaussian Eb
FC19 Zadeh Centroid no KB3 Gaussian Ec
FC20 Zadeh Mean of max no KB3 Gaussian Ec
FC21 Product Centroid no KB3 Gaussian Ec
FC22 Product Mean of max no KB3 Gaussian Ec
FC23  Lukasiewicz Centroid no KB3 Gaussian Ec
FC24  Lukasiewicz Mean of max no KB3 Gaussian Ec
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Appendix D. Density plots
Figure D.27: Density plots of inferred MWL scalars by all designed models and baseline
instruments. A{1-8} are argument-based models. FC{01-24} are fuzzy reasoning models of
Gaussian fuzzy membership functions. FL{01-24} are fuzzy reasoning models of linear fuzzy
membership functions. E{1-8} are expert system models. Other graphs are the result of
baseline models (NASA-TLX, Raw TLX, WP and Self Report) in the different experiments
(Ea, Eb and Ec).
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